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ABSTRACT
Wilkinson, Brett David. A validation study of the orientation model. Published Doctor of
Philosophy dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2016.

The orientation model is a multidimensional measure of dual-processing
capacities that incorporates four empirically-validated instruments taken from the
existing literature on cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and self-focused
attention. As a strength-based conceptualization tool for humanistic counseling practices,
the model is intended to provide counselors with a flexible means to assess nondiagnostic client attributes within a dispositional model of client cognitive processing
patterns. Although humanistic principles often conflict with the use of quantitative
instruments in clinical practice, the model is guided by the tenet that objective measures
can effectively supplement clinical insight into client patterns of functioning. It thus
serves as a means by which to bridge the gap between objective testing and the
philosophical tenets upheld by humanistic counselors.
As such, this survey-based study examined the habitual use of dual-process
tendencies using four established, non-clinical, and empirically-validated instruments: the
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), the
Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the
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Interpersonal Reactivity In dex (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the Reflection-Rumination
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The coherence of the orientation
model rests on the presupposition that each of the subscales within the four instruments
correspond with distinct dual-processing styles. The current study was designed to
explore this possibility in order to validate the conceptual underpinnings of the
orientation model itself.
Self-report responses from 375 college students were used to determine whether
relationships grounded in dual-processing capacities exist among the disparate model
variables. Canonical correlation and multivariate analysis of variance results suggest that
the orientation model provides a descriptive framework for distinguishing self-perceived
adaptiveness or perceptiveness from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity rather than
providing an explanatory foundation linked to dual process theories. This interpretation is
examined in relation to the dual-processing literature, and directions for future research
and theory generation are suggested. Practical implications are discussed in terms of
applying the model as a case conceptualization tool in clinical and supervisory settings,
concerns related to potential misinterpretations of a thinking/feeling dichotomy in clinical
practice, and the therapeutic value of the instruments outside a dual-process framework.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The assessments typically taught in counselor education courses and used by
counselors in the field span five primary areas of clinical interest (Neukrug, Peterson,
Bonner, & Lomas, 2013): diagnosis and psychopathology, symptom severity, problem
behaviors, intelligence, and personality-based career compatibility. Valuable as these
categories are in terms of illuminating general trait and behavioral tendencies among
clients, they provide little relevant information regarding subtler client processes of
interpretation, internalization, and interaction (Wilkinson, 2015). Clinical assessments of
problem behaviors, symptom severity, and diagnostic criteria tend to emphasize client
limitations rather than strengths (Elkins, 2007). Furthermore, the usefulness of
personality testing has arguably limited practical usefulness for counselors (Epstein,
2010), while intelligence measures are primary of use with relatively narrow and specific
populations (Seligman, 1996).
This study was designed to validate the conceptual tenets of the orientation model
as a strength-based conceptualization framework for humanistic counselors (Wilkinson,
2015). The model is a versatile assessment tool designed to provide counselors with a
means to recognize and address important client attributes within a humanistic and
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existential framework (Wilkinson, 2015). In this respect, it asserts that insight into the
dispositional tendencies of clients can provide counselors with relevant information on
how clients interpret their experiences in and of the world. Constructs related to cognitive
processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection are assessed using already established
and well-validated measures developed by psychologists to ascertain within-individual
differences. Each of the four measures were originally constructed using confirmatory
factor analysis to test theoretically-grounded hypotheses. As such, the orientation model
benefits from being a psychological model “situated within a coherent, intraindividual
theoretical framework” (J. Block, 2010, p. 5) that lends itself to applied counseling
practices.
As a supplement to counseling practice, the orientation model provides a flexible
means by which to ascertain how dispositional variations in cognitive and emotional
processing influence client experiences in the world. The model proposes that unique,
client-specific processing patterns result in distinctive presenting styles and behavioral
consequences. Furthermore, it suggests that each of the measures of cognitive processing,
attachment, empathy, and introspection used in the model actually gauge dispositional
variations that align with the tenets of dual-process theories. Dual-process theories
provide the overarching theoretical framework for the orientation model and suggest that
two distinctive yet highly interactive cognitive processing systems - analytic and
experiential - operate within the human experience. The orientation model asserts that by
harnessing measures that distinguish between the preferential, habitual use of these dualprocessing tendencies, counselors can effectively supplement their clinical observations
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and judgments with valuable assessment data that informs case conceptualization
practices and augments treatment planning.
Dual Process Theories
The general tenets of dual-process theory provide the theoretical foundation for
the orientation model, serving as the conceptual glue that binds the different constructs
and measures into a cohesive whole. Supportive evidence in both developmental (Reyna
& Rivers, 2008) and affective (Panksepp, 2003) neuroscience lends heightened credibility
to the burgeoning experimental and theoretical work conducted on dual-process concepts
in social and cognitive psychology (Epstein, 2014; Evans, 2010). In terms of evolutionary
biology, the more recently developed analytic system involves the controlled and rational
processing capacities of the neocortex, as contrasted with the more primitive, automatic,
and affect-oriented experiential processing of the limbic system (Epstein, 2014; Evans,
2010; Panksepp, 1998). Each system is therefore related to unique processing capacities.
Analytic-rational cognitive processes are logical, intentional, explicit, conscious,
linguistic, and slow whereas experiential-intuitive cognitive processes are associative,
automatic, implicit, preconscious, symbolic, and fast (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014).
Despite their unique capacities, however, the analytic and experiential systems are
highly integrated. In fact, such dichotomous divisions belie the level of integration
necessary for cognition to be evolutionarily adaptive, as explicit cognitive representations
of the world rely upon primary experiences such as implicit attitudes and feelings in order
to ground a cognitive simulation (Stanovich et al., 2014). Similar conjectures about the
integrative nature of dual-processing systems is found in philosophy of mind, as the interdependence of access and phenomenal consciousness parallel discussions held among
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dual-process theorists (Chalmers, 1996; N. Block, 1995). The implications of a lack of
integration is similarly discussed across both fields, with concerns levied in regards to
how the lack of “theory of mind” among individuals on the autism spectrum might be a
consequence of uncontrolled analytic and experiential decoupling (Chalmers, 1996;
Hwang, Evans, & Mackenzie, 2007; Stanovich et al., 2014).
Yet the distinction between the two systems remains leverageable for the
purposes of counseling precisely due to the integrative nature of analytic and experiential
processes (Epstein, 2014). From Plato (380 BC/1974) to William James (1890/1950), the
duality of thinking and feeling has historically served to illuminate the remarkable
dispositional differences we observe among individuals. Viewed on a continuum,
habitual tendencies towards either rational or emotional processing manifest in distinctive
ways that counselors can easily recognize from clinical experience. It is this thinkingfeeling dichotomy that many counselors utilize to design individual treatment approaches
that fit the unique needs of particular clients (Epstein, 2014). So while the complexities of
dual-processes are granted due respect in the orientation model, the thinking-feeling
dichotomy remains a viable and pragmatic way to connect counselor observations with
assessment methods to inform clinical judgments, case conceptualizations, and treatment
decisions (Wilkinson, 2015).
By focusing on broader dispositional trends rather than specific or narrow traits
and behaviors, the orientation model eschews simplistic labels in favor of rich and
dynamic descriptions of intrapersonal experience. In combination, the four constructs of
cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection lend insight into how
clients uniquely experience and manifest the thinking-feeling dichotomy in their own
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lifeworld (Wilkinson, 2015). Individual variations across these dual-processing
tendencies, stemming from the habitual use of particular coping strategies (Evans, 2010),
are a consequence of the reinforcement and activation of either analytic or experiential
processes under conditions of stress (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In accord with humanistic
principles, the model thus provides a holistic perspective on how clients subjectively
interpret experiences through the lens of habitual cognitive patterns, and it actively
avoids the use of symptom or diagnosis-based language (Greenberg, Elliot, & Lietaer,
2003). Counselors can utilize such an assessment-derived analysis of client patterns to
choose treatments that capitalize on individual strengths within a descriptive framework
without resorting to narrow categorizations or labels.
Design of the Orientation Model
For each of the four constructs and corresponding measures, two subscales are
used to distinguish between analytic and experiential tendencies. These relate to rational
and intuitive cognition styles, emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity attachment
styles, cognitive and emotional empathy styles, and reflective and ruminative
introspection styles (Wilkinson, 2015). The only measure used in the orientation model
that was designed based upon a dual-process theory framework is the RationalExperiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996), used to distinguish between rational
and intuitive styles of cognition. The other three measures were developed independently
of dual process theorizing, and so the orientation model presupposes that each of their
sub-measures correspond with distinct dual-processing styles. The current study was
therefore designed to explore this hypothesis in order to validate the conceptual
underpinnings of the orientation model itself.
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The therapeutic value of relating these constructs to dual-processing tendencies
arises from the way in which their distinctive combinations can be used as a lens through
which to understand client interpretations of experience. In this manner, each construct
represents a continuum of growth-potential that also sheds light on the motivational
factors underlying the presenting concerns and related behaviors of clients (Cervone,
2005). For a client that presents with a history of depression and unsatisfactory
relationships, for example, the course of treatment is going to vary depending on a
multitude of dynamic factors. This is a typical scenario in which the counselor has a
vague understanding of client presenting concerns and history, and proceeds with the
intention of discovering important details about the client in order to develop an
appropriate treatment plan. However, the initial course of treatment will look
significantly different if the counselor knows this client experiences high levels of
cognitive processing with moderate to low levels of experiential processing, high levels
of emotional cutoff, relatively low levels of cognitive empathy, moderate to high levels
of emotional empathy, and rumination tendencies. Each of these scores provide important
descriptive information regarding how this client interprets their life experience, relates to
others, and copes when under stress.
This client is likely to be a highly analytical ruminator with a limited ability to
grasp the viewpoints of others and a history of cutoff relationships, but a relatively high
degree of sensitivity to, and empathic felt-sense of, compassionate awareness. Put another
way, this client operates within a distinctive lifeworld experience: from a rational
viewpoint, avoidant of emotional conflict, limited in their cognitive perspective-taking
yet sensitive to emotional cues, and liable to chronically introspect on negative past
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experiences. The primary benefit of this assessment is twofold: it highlights the strengths
of this client and it lends the information immediately to the counselor. Our hypothetical
client’s rationality and emotional empathy in particular are primed for clinical use, and
also serves as additional fodder for the building of counselor empathy towards the client.
It further allows the counselor to develop a rich conceptualization early in the therapeutic
process, thus lending itself to an intentional verification process rather than an arbitrarily
exploratory one.
At the same time, the orientation model does not presuppose that a particular
course of treatment should derive from the information highlighted in the assessment.
The model itself is fundamentally atheoretical, serving as a means to clarify the
dispositional tendencies of clients by highlighting important factors that contextualize
presenting concerns and behaviors. As a functional apparatus for case conceptualization
purposes, it maintains that treatment should proceed according to the clinical judgment
and expertise of the counselor. So while the model is designed within a humanisticexistential framework, it is important to recognize that the assessment can be used across
any and all theoretical orientations.
However, the model does provide a conceptually coherent framework for
humanistic and existential counselors who may be otherwise disinclined to utilize
assessments as a therapeutic tool. Since the accurate identification of dispositional styles
is arguably a key component of clinical decision-making across theoretical orientations
(Wilkinson, 2015), the use of assessments to augment the selection of therapeutic
strategies, techniques, and interventions does not depart significantly from the standard
process of making clinical judgments. In this respect, the orientation model can be
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designated as an atheoretical, strengths-based conceptualization tool designed within an
existential-humanistic conceptual framework (Wilkinson, 2015). Whether used as a
supplement for situation-specific clinical judgments or as a template for building
humanistic case conceptualizations, it grants counselors an opportunity to gain insight
into important features of client experience and style of interpretation. By means of its
validation in this study, a new and valuable tool for counselors in practice may become
accessible.
Problem Statement
Dual-process theories have been predominantly used as a theoretical basis for
exploring phenomena such as implicit memory (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), decision
making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), deductive reasoning (Evans &
Over, 1996), and implicit learning (Reber, 1993; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005) in
cognitive psychology, as well as social judgment (Bargh, 2006, Wilson, 2002), persuasion
(Chaiken, 1987; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), stereotypes (Devine, 1989;
Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), and implicit attitudes (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) in social psychology. Attempts
to directly apply dual-process theories in a therapeutic context have been either within
complex, global personality assessment frameworks that require counselors to adopt the
entire conceptual system (Epstein, 2014), or in relation to highly specific topics such as
bereavement (Schut, 1999; Stroebe & Schut, 2010) and perfectionism (Slade & Owens,
1998).
In an effort to bridge the gap between dual process theories and humanistic
counseling, the orientation model seeks to highlight the value of measuring specific dual-
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processing dispositions of clients so as to further enhance case conceptualization
practices in therapy (Wilkinson, 2015). Guided by general dual-process theories and
applied within an existential framework, the orientation model was designed to benefit
the therapeutic process by giving counselors of the humanistic persuasion a practical tool
for assessing important dispositional traits in clients without resorting to diagnostic labels
or other reductionist methods (Wilkinson, 2015). However, the relationships among the
variables used in the orientation model have not yet been assessed. Validating such a
humanistic-existential assessment model for clinical use will grant counselors an
opportunity to utilize dispositional assessments that lend insight into specific
characteristics that may serve to either impede or facilitate client growth towards the
fulfillment of basic psychological needs and adaptive functioning.
Rationale
Although the use of assessment instruments among counselors is on the rise
(Cashel, 2009), many practitioners and counselor educators maintain that psychological
testing and assessment is incongruent with the principles guiding counselor identity
(Neukrug, Peterson, Bonner, & Lomas, 2013). This may be due in no small part to a
sense that quantitative measures – typically designed to operate as an objective tool for
assessment and diagnosis - may somehow detract from the personal, non-judgmental
nature of the positive therapeutic relationship (Clark, 2001). According to a recent
inquiry into the use of testing instruments by counselors in the field, there appears to be a
high prevalence of test use but at a very low average frequency (Peterson, Lomas,
Neukrug, & Bonner, 2014). This trend holds across counseling sub-specialties, as the
types of assessments administered differ based on area of specialization and yet the
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average use of assessments in general remains about the same (Peterson et al., 2014). So
while counselors across various specializations incorporate some testing and assessment
in their clinical practices, they tend to do so relatively rarely.
In regard to counselor training, multiple studies indicate that counselors feel
unprepared to conduct assessments in the field (Mellin, Hunt, & Nichols, 2011; Villalba,
Latus, & Hamilton, 2005) while counselor educators appear largely uninterested in
teaching assessment courses (Davis, Chang, & McGlothlin, 2005). Uncertainty abounds
as to the types of assessments that should be taught in masters-level programs; an issue
which, it has been suggested, should be addressed in a rigorous and standardized manner
to ensure students are adequately prepared for clinical practice (Peterson, Lomas,
Neukrug, & Bonner, 2014). However, both counselors and counselor educators alike
tended to regard the 2001 assessment standards set forth by the Council for Accreditation
of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP) as one of the three least
beneficial core curriculum standards (McGlothlin & Davis, 2004). The 2009 CACREP
standards remained just as broad and tentative in its suggestions on the use and teaching
of assessments as its predecessor (Neukrug, Peterson, Bonner, & Lomas, 2013), and the
2016 core standards appear to differ little in this respect. So while there is widespread
agreement among counselor educators that assessment courses are an important part of
training, there is little agreement as to which tests and measures should be emphasized
and how best to prepare future counselors for conducting assessments in the field
(Neukrug et al. 2013).
Empirical research suggests that seven categories of assessment are particularly
valuable for counselors across a variety of specializations and clinical roles, including
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personality, projective, career, intelligence/cognitive, educational/achievement,
clinical/behavioral, and environmental/interpersonal (Peterson, Lomas, Neukrug, &
Bonner, 2014). Within this array of categories it appears those assessments taught by
counselor educators span five practical areas of clinical need including symptom severity,
diagnostic criteria and psychopathology, problem behaviors, general intelligence, and
personality-based career compatibility (Wilkinson, 2015). As implemented by
practitioners, these areas of inquiry are quite useful in terms of providing relevant clinical
information on client-specific traits and behaviors. However, personality tests have been
eschewed as insignificant contributors to counseling practice (Boyle, 2008; Epstein,
2010), and general intelligence tests have been similarly called into question (Seligman,
1996), while measures of diagnostic criteria and psychopathology, symptom severity, and
problem behaviors tend to overlook client strengths in favor of limitations (Elkins, 2007).
For the purposes of clinical practice, objective measures are designed to provide
counselors with additional and supplementary insight into client patterns of functioning.
The elusive qualities of psychological experience and human behavior in general have
made such assessments a vital part of the counseling field (Scholl, McGowan, & Hansen,
2012). Yet the philosophical tenets guiding humanistic counseling are viewed by many as
running contrary to this purpose (Brown, 1972). It has been asserted that psychometric
procedures are not only reductionistic and antithetical to the humanistic endeavor, but
that humanistic practices “will always show a preference for qualitative and human
science research” (Greening, 2002, p. 5). Others have also noted that assessment and
testing are widely “viewed as incongruent with the qualitative, postmodernist perspective
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underlying human science methodologies” that is preferentially adopted by those of the
humanistic persuasion (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006, p. 512).
Insight into the subjective experience of the client tends to be favored over
objective analysis, whereby the individual is regarded as being figuratively reduced to a
set of a circumscribed categories or labels (Clark, 2001; Scholl, Ray, & Brady-Amoon,
2014). Furthermore, the humanistic drive to connect with “the person of the client” does
not naturally lend itself to the use of objective tests and measures insofar as these means
of assessment are viewed as a way to inadvertently undermine the perceived agency of
clients (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Yet while this may anecdotally appear to be a
relevant concern considering the influence of judgment biases on clinical decisionmaking (Wood & Tracey, 2009) and therapeutic outcomes (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994),
no significant evidence supports the notion that assessment use negatively influences how
counselors engage, support, or regard their clients (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006).
Alternatively, some psychologists espouse the potential benefits of developing
humanistic testing and assessment methods despite the philosophical conflicts perceived
as inherent by opponents of this suggestion (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Such a
discussion is conspicuously absent from the humanistic counselor education literature,
despite numerous calls for a greater degree of assessment and testing integration into
counselor training as a whole (Balkin, 2014; Naugle, 2009; Neukrug et al., 2014).
Considering the relatively high number of self-identifying humanistic, existential, and
person-centered counselor educators within the field (Calley & Hawley, 2008), this lack
of discourse would seem to represent a significant oversight. It may also provide an
explanation for why assessment and testing remain under-emphasized in master's-level
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training. If counselor educators and researchers are at some level ideologically opposed
to psychometric testing due to their humanistic inclinations, then it stands to reason that
the field would place less active emphasis on training in this area. As such, this issue may
actually be a consequence of an implicit rather than explicit bias against tests and
measures.
Humanistic counselors indelibly seek to preserve the tenets of humanistic
philosophy by engaging in practices that emphasize concepts such as subjectivity,
growth, agency, relationships, and holism (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Hesitancy or
outright rejection of the use of assessment instruments is thus founded upon some sense
that objective testing conflicts with these basic humanistic tenets, particularly stemming
from resistance to the notion of the counselor behaving as an expert. To properly combat
this concern, Friedman and MacDonald (2006) suggest that the assessment process
should be interactive, facilitate growth-oriented discussions, and rely upon client
feedback and clarification. Fischer (1979) similarly noted the importance of approaching
assessment procedures as a descriptive rather than a categorical process in view of the
“situated intentionality” of clients (p. 116). In other words, testing should be used to
augment clinical understanding such that it may further inform the primary client
disclosures of subjective experience rather than serve as an objective substitute.
With an eye towards building a humanistic assessment framework for the
purposes of clinical case conceptualization, Wilkinson (2015) constructed the orientation
model as a means by which to bridge the gap between objective testing and the
philosophical tenets upheld by humanistic counselors. It incorporates four empiricallyvalidated and well-established measures developed by psychologists using confirmatory
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factor analysis to test hypotheses within pre-established theoretical frameworks and to
examine specific dispositional variables within individuals. This procedure for
determining within-individual differences contrasts with those personality measures
which use exploratory factor analysis to analyze between-individual differences from an
atheoretical vantage point (Boyle, 2008; Cervone, 2005).
As noted by the eminent psychologist Jack Block (1995), properly designed
psychological models should be “situated within a coherent, intraindividual framework”
rather than be “overly preoccupied with the study of interindividual differences” (p. 210).
The orientation model was explicitly designed to serve as just such a client-specific
framework for humanistic counseling (Wilkinson, 2015). While its basic conceptual
foundation has been explored, the model's validity remains in question. The purpose of
this study is thus to validate the orientation model through quantitative methods to
determine the relationships among the model’s four empirically-validated psychological
measures. It is thereby proposed that gaining insight into potential relationships among
the orientation model's four constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and
introspection can result in an effective case conceptualization model which supplements
not only humanistic and experiential counseling approaches in particular, but counseling
practice more generally as well.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this study is to test a case conceptualization model of dispositional
factors and an accompanying assessment tool that can be used by counselors to assess
client strengths and growth areas early in the therapeutic process. This survey-based
study will examine the habitual use of dual-process tendencies across four important
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dimensions of functioning, including cognitive processing styles, attachment styles,
empathy styles, and introspection styles (Wilkinson, 2015). Four corresponding,
empirically-validated surveys will be used to measure these dimensions: the RationalExperiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), the
Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the Reflection-Rumination
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Research Questions
Q1

Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)?

Q2

Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI,
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ?

Q3

How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale
of the REI?

Q4

How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores)
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the
REI?

Q5

How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition
subscale of the REI?
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Definition of Key Terms
Dual-Processing
For the purposes of this study, dual processing refers to the theorized notion that
“humans operate within two information processing systems, an ‘experiential system,’
which automatically learns from experience, and a ‘rational system,’ which is a verbal
reasoning system” (Epstein, 2014, p. 3). It further indicates a dispositional tendency to
employ either rational or experiential methods of cognitive processing under conditions
of stress (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The rational system is defined as “intentional,
analytic, primarily verbal, and relatively affect free” while the experiential system is
defined as “automatic, preconscious, holistic, associationistic, primarily nonverbal, and
intimately associated with affect” (Epstein et al., 1996, p. 391). Although the dual
processing systems generally operate in tandem, stress tends to elicit the preferential,
dispositional use of one system or the other as a conditioned response.
Dispositional Attachment
For the purposes of this study, dispositional attachment refers to the habitual use
of emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity as coping strategies under conditions of
interpersonal stress (Wilkinson, 2015). Based on Differentiation of Self Theory (DST,
Bowen, 1978), emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity are viewed through the lens of
dual-process theory as dispositional attachment tendencies that connect with the rational
and experiential cognitive systems, respectively. Psychological self-differentiation
enhances aspects of cognitive flexibility and affective resilience that support healthy
relational boundaries and coping capacities (Bowen, 1978). Maladaptive emotional and
interpersonal consequences arise from the dispositional attachment tendencies of
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emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity, including issues related to trust, intimacy, and
autonomy (Skowron & Dendy, 2004).
Dispositional Empathy
For the purposes of this study, dispositional empathy refers to the habitual use of
cognitive and emotional empathy as adaptive processing strategies in the formation and
interpretation of interpersonal relationships (Wilkinson, 2015). Empathy denotes a form
of cognitive understanding of, or emotional sensitivity towards, the experience of others
(Davis, 1983; Strayer, 1987). Cognitive empathy involves the mental or psychological
ability to vicariously experience the perceptual perspective of others (Davis, 1996;
Strayer, 1987) while emotional empathy involves an affective ability to vicariously
experience the immediate felt sense of others (Davis, 1980; Gendlin, 1974). An ability to
experience both forms of empathy is empirically related to healthy interpersonal
functioning and pro-social behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1995) and contribute to the
implementation of effective coping strategies (Davis, 1996; Long & Andrews, 1990).
Dispositional Introspection
For the purposes of this study, dispositional introspection refers to the habitual use
of reflective and ruminative styles of self-focused attention under conditions of stress
(Wilkinson, 2015). Reflective self-focus denotes a tendency to intellectually analyze
current, past, and potential future experiences, and is motivated by curiosity (Trapnell &
Campbell, 1999). Ruminative self-focus involves the tendency to chronically assess
current, past, or potential future experiences for threats, and is motivated by selfpreservation (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) While reflective introspection is associated
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with cognitive distancing from emotional experience, ruminative introspection is related
to affective immersion in the processing of negative emotions (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel,
2005).
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, the review of literature includes the origins, developments, and
conceptual foundations of modern dual-process theories across cognitive, social, and
personality psychology. Major theoretical writings and research studies related to dualprocess theories are summarized. A thorough exploration of both the current tripartite
model of dual-process theory (Stanovich, 2012) and cognitive-experiential theory
(Epstein, 2014) paves the way for examining the theoretical and practical grounding of
the orientation model (Wilkinson, 2015). The four constructs and concomitant theories
included in the model are discussed in detail and potential implications of the model as a
case conceptualization tool for humanistic and existential counseling are analyzed.
Dual-Process Theories
The histories of philosophy and psychology are replete with inquiries into
separable aspects of the human mind. From the tripartite divisions of reason, spirit, and
appetite in Plato's Republic (380 BC/1974) to the dualistic view of conscious and
unconscious set forth by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), we have
long sought to understand mental experience in terms of distinctly functioning
components. However, the origins of a modern dual-process perspective on information
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processing can be traced most clearly to psychologist William James (1890/1950), who
proposed that human thought involves both true reasoning and association. He
maintained that these are interdependent and facilitative conditions of thought, albeit
spontaneous in the case of associations and voluntary in the case of reasoning (James,
1890/1950). Eschewing the psychoanalytic view that the unconscious is a hidden entity
of the mind, James asserted that some thoughts become subconscious by means of
habituation inasmuch as they no longer require direct conscious attention yet arise under
specific facilitative conditions (Weber, 2012).
Dual-process theories came to prominence in psychology once again nearly a
hundred years later with Evans' (1984) two-stage theory of human inference
distinguishing heuristic from analytical processes. Modern dual-process approaches have
sought to explain various behavioral outcomes by delineating two mental systems
according to functionally-distinct yet interdependent information processing capacities
(Sloman, 2014). While the domain-specific theories seek to identify specific content areas
in which dual-processing phenomena occur as input-output relations, the generalized
dual-system theories seek to identify broader principles of human thought that subsume
those domain-specific accounts (Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). By providing a
generalized account of higher-level cognition, dual-process theories serve as a conceptual
umbrella under which both domain-specific phenomena and dual-system models of
behavioral tendencies are explained and understood.
The distinction between dual-process theories as a general account of mental
phenomena and dual-system theories as a specific account of mental architecture is of
particular interest herein. Both conceptually and chronologically, general dual-process
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theories precede dual-system theories, even as the latter have become increasingly
prominent across various fields of psychology such as social cognition, learning,
reasoning, and decision-making (Frankish & Evans, 2009). The current relevance of dualprocessing across these specialty areas has been largely due to the rise of dual-system
theories over the past twenty years (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Rather than view these as
fully independent approaches, however, it is perhaps more beneficial to recognize that
dual-system theories attempt to enhance the general dual-process framework by
introducing additional features that provide a greater degree of specificity to each system
(Frankish & Evans, 2009).
Dual-process theories make a clear distinction between two processing systems,
but invoke no explanations as to how these systems relate either to one another or to other
aspects of cognition. Generally speaking, type 1 processes are “characterized as fast,
effortless, automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and undemanding
of working memory”, whereas type 2 processes are “slow, effortful, controlled,
conscious, flexible, decontextualized, and demanding of working memory” (Frankish &
Evans, 2009, p. 1). In this respect, dual-process theories seek to describe the basic
capacities of type 1 and 2 processes as observed in experimental testing, but refrain from
suggesting how they might relate to some of the more dynamic aspects of human
cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). There is
little room for extrapolation in the descriptive approach of dual-process theories that seek
only to delineate between two types of cognitive processing capacities.
Dual-system theories, on the other hand, are far more inclusive and complex.
Drawing upon far reaching fields of scientific inquiry, dual-system theories typically
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make reference to ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ processes rather than types so as to
emphasize their evolutionary interdependence in human cognition (Stanovich, 2004).
While allusions to evolutionary theory are but one hallmark feature of dual-system
theories, it serves to highlight the movement away from mere description and towards
advanced explanations of the role and features of the dual processing system. In effect,
System 1 has been described as an intuitive, pragmatic, associative, implicit, and
evolutionarily old processing capacity that is independent of general intelligence and
shared with animals (Frankish & Evans, 2009). In contrast, System 2 is typically
characterized as a reflective, logical, rule-based, explicit, and evolutionarily recent
processing capacity that is linked to general intelligence (Frankish & Evans, 2009).
Extending well beyond the confines of description, dual-systems theories seek to provide
a comprehensive account of how the systems relate, differ, and combine to explain a
diverse array of human cognitive processing capacities.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the phrase dual-process theory will be used
in reference to both the general dual-process theories and the more specific dual-system
theories, as suggested by Frankish and Evans (2009) for convenience and clarity. Since
dual-system theories are meant to expand upon the foundation established by dualprocess theories without deviating from those basic premises, this equivocation should
provide readers with a more consistent and coherent understanding of the ideas set forth
herein as a matter of basic continuity. However, it should be reiterated that the approaches
remain distinctive in terms of how far they are willing to go in their speculations, despite
the fact that dual-process and dual-system accounts originate from the same basic,
underlying tenets. While these nuanced distinctions are surely important for advanced
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theoretical work in the social and cognitive specialization areas that explore dual-process
structures and functions, it has been suggested by several dual-process researchers that
the conceptual underpinnings of both are sufficiently related to warrant a merging of their
ideas for the purpose of applied practice in counseling and psychotherapy (Anchin,
Singer, & Magnavita, 2016; Epstein, 2014).
Modern History of Dual-Process Theories
Although dual-process theories gained widespread recognition as a foundational
concept in the psychological sciences with Evans’ (1984) two-stage theory of human
inference, at least one major researchers was exploring related concepts more than a
decade earlier. In studying differences between implicit and explicit learning beginning
late in the 1960’s, Reber (1993) proposed that two distinct processing systems guide
human learning and decision-making. He further suggested that a ‘cognitive unconscious’
processing system might explain how memories are acquired without explicit awareness
that learning has taken place (Reber, 1993). Although there has been considerable debate
as to whether implicit learning occurs with or without some degree of explicit awareness
(Shanks & St. John, 1994; Redington & Chater, 2002), current neuropsychological
findings lend support to the idea that human memory functions across multiple and
distinct neurological systems rather than within a unified or centralized system
(Carruthers, 2006).
While the work of Reber (1993) has often been cited as an early influence on
dual-processing ideas, it was a series of experiments conducted on deductive reasoning
tasks that provides the most direct foundation for modern dual-process theories. Seeking
to explain discrepancies between behaviors and introspective reports similar to those
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observed by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) in their seminal article on deductive reasoning,
three separate experiments were launched to explore deductive reasoning fallacies using
the famous Wason (1966) selection task. Whereas the first provided supporting evidence
for a matching bias in deductive reasoning (Evans & Lynch, 1973), the second revealed
that participants tend to explain their selection task choices in quite rational terms despite
the fact that a conditional, non-logical matching bias actually guided those choices
(Wason & Evans, 1975).
This unexpected outcome led to renewed theorizing on the underlying
mechanisms at work in those deductive reasoning tasks that invoke non-logical biases yet
are accompanied by the illusion of logical decision-making (Evans, 1977). The
explanation proposed by Wason and Evans (1975) was that the introspective reports made
by participants were actually post hoc rationalizations, indicating that the matching bias
associated with the Wason selection task is an unconscious response process distinct from
the rational deductive process activated in terms of participant rationalizations. The
seminal study published two years later by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) on discrepancies
between observable participant behaviors and introspective reports served to bring
widespread scientific attention to this very gap between implicitly-primed cues and
explicitly-evaluated attributions.
The implication of these findings in relation to dual-process accounts of cognition
were not fully realized until the development of the two-stage theory of human inference
(Evans, 1984) and then, more comprehensively, the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning
(Evans, 1989). During this period, dual-process accounts of various domain-specific
areas of social cognition came to prominence, including specific theories of persuasion
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(Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), dispositional attributions (Gilbert, 1989;
Trope, 1986), impression formation (Brewer, 1988), and prejudice (Devine, 1989).
However, it was Evans (1984, 1989) who provided the first general dual-process theory
account of human reasoning and decision-making as distinct types. Both theoretical
accounts proposed that unconscious heuristics (i.e., type 1 processes) function as a rapid
form of inductive cognitive processing whereas conscious analytical reasoning (i.e., type
2 processing) is a slower form of logical or deductive cognition.
The conflict between non-logical biases and logical processes was also being
scrutinized around this time by the economists Tversky and Kahneman (1983) in terms of
probabilistic judgment and cognitive fallacies. Examining how participants used intuitive
heuristics to make decisions under circumstance of uncertainty, their research indicated
that individuals tend to rely upon availability heuristics to make such decisions even
when this violates the basic conjunction rule, or the rule of formal logic in which the
probability of two independent events both happening cannot be exceeded by those
events happening in combination (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Similar results in studies
examining the rational theory of choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986) and norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) eventually led to
renewed theorizing on the heuristic and analytical elements at work in bounded
rationality (Kahneman, 2003) and the seminal development of an economic dual-process
model of decision-making (Kahneman, 2011).
It is notable that these ideas developed in separate scientific fields without due
awareness of their simultaneity. Despite the obvious alignment with the tenets of dualprocess theories, the Nobel Prize winning economist remained unaware of this
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connection until after the turn of the century (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Similar
events were unfolding for social cognition researchers attempting to explain
discrepancies between social behaviors and professed attitudes, as well as the
automaticity of social judgments (see Bargh, 2006, Wilson, 2002). Dual-process
approaches to social cognition occurred independently of those advancements made in
the psychological study of reasoning, as is often the case in disparate areas of research
(Frankish & Evans, 2009). However, the basic tenets underlying each remains the same,
with heuristic and analytical processes also used to explain the formation of attitudes,
judgments, self-regulation, and attributions in social psychology (Bargh, 2006).
Conceptual advancements made by dual-process theories of social cognition
appear primarily to be a result of the interests associated with this field of study itself.
While research into deductive and inductive reasoning capacities emphasizes controlled
studies of memory and learning, social cognition research naturally introduces a variety
of confounding factors due to its emphasis on individual differences and situational
conditions (Feldman, 2014). This provides researchers of social cognition ample
opportunity to create expansive models and theories which encompass a broader swath of
social phenomena with more generalizable social implications than those founds in
cognitive research alone (Smith & Collins, 2009; Wyer & Srull, 2014). Insofar as the
study of implicit social cognition has largely become the de facto foundation of social
psychology research in the last decade (Payne & Gawronski, 2010), it is not surprising
that some of the most advanced and influential dual process theories have evolved within
this particular area of inquiry.
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Echoing notions of the “cognitive unconscious” as set forth by Reber (1993), the
development of cognitive-experiential theory (CET; Epstein, 1991) marked a dramatic
shift towards the integration of emotional processing capacities into dual-process theories
(Smith & Collins, 2009). By aligning the preconscious experiential system with affective
capacities, CET not only bridged the gap between cognitive research accounts of heuristic
influences on deductive reasoning and social cognitive research on self-regulation
(Epstein, 2003), but made dual-process theories accessible to applied fields such as
counseling and psychotherapy (Epstein, 1994, 1987). Additionally, rather than view the
rational system as the more advanced process of cognition, CET (1994, 2003) suggests a
requisite primacy of the experiential cognitive system due to both its integration with
affect and its adaptive evolutionary value. While still maintaining that the experiential
and rational systems are both synchronous and complementary, CET vitalized discussions
on the contribution of emotion to cognitive processing (Frankish & Evans, 2009).
In a return to the descriptions of higher thought processes by William James
(1905/1977), Sloman (1996) proposed associative and rule-based true reasoning systems
in an empirical reevaluation of past studies and arguments on deductive reasoning. This
highly influential article was the first to describe type 1 and type 2 processes as parallel
computational systems with distinct neurological structures that are guided by unique
algorithms (Sloman, 2014). Whereas the associative system is reflexive, inferential, and
pattern-seeking, the rule-based true reasoning system is deliberate, hierarchical, and
causality-seeking, yet the two function in tandem as complementary approaches to
reasoning activated under specific circumstances (Sloman, 1996). The activation of either
system is regarded as context-dependent since the amount of accessible information
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determines which algorithmic processes are triggered, which in turn depends upon what
rules the individual has learned in relation to the given context (Sloman, 1996).
In effect, this computational approach to reasoning and judgment laid the
groundwork for the integrative dual-process theories of memory which were to follow
(Evans, 2009). Although Sloman (2014) made significant revisions to his computational
dual-process approach so as to merge affective and somatic influences into its theoretical
structure – much akin to that seen in CEST (Epstein, 2003) – the original algorithmic
distinction had made its mark. Evans and Over (1996) made similar computational
assertions that also contributed to this movement, although Evans (2008) still maintains
that type 1 and type 2 processes are memory-oriented reasoning systems and only
superficially related to affect. With the computational distinction between an implicit
system of personal learning and an explicit system of effortful or conscious learning,
dual-process theories were clearly moving towards rule-based conceptualizations
(Frankish & Evans, 2009).
However, it was the conceptual shift from parallel to overlapping systems of dualprocessing that served as the final impetus for major integrative efforts due to the
inclusion of input-output processes for the resolution of type 1 and type 2 conflicts
(Stanovich, 2004). Importantly, it was also within this article that the terms System 1 and
System 2 were coined (Stanovich, 1999), which would later be brought to prominence
and near universal usage among theorists and laypersons alike with the seminal article by
Kahneman and Frederick (2002). Distinguishing between the disparate goals structures of
System 1 and System 2, Stanovich (1999) promoted the idea that an override of System 1
by the rational means of System 2 is typically beneficial insofar as System 1 is oriented
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towards reproduction goals while System 2 is oriented towards coherence goals of agency
or personhood. Furthermore, experiments using an updated version of the Wason
selection task identified that System 2 is not only related to general intelligence, but can
be empirically measured to establish individual difference patterns in deductive reasoning
abilities (Stanovich, 2004).
These results pointed towards the renewed possibility that dual-process theories
might be integrated by defining System 1 and System 2 in terms of distinct memory
systems (Smith & Collins, 2009). An integrative memory-based dual process model was
subsequently developed by Smith and DeCoster (2000) in an attempt to reconcile the
widening theoretical postulates of various dual process theories while incorporating the
empirical data linking System 1 and System 2 functions to memory. Proposing that
associative and rule-based processes are structurally linked to distinct memory systems,
Smith and DeCoster (2000) asserted that rule-based processes actively consume
attentional resources and therefore not only require intentional activation by means of a
motivation impetus, but may be directly influenced by mood and implicit judgments. If
there is interference with System 2 activation due to some motivational deterrent, then the
slow-learning System 1 with its pattern-completion tendencies will automatically prime
cognitive, affective, or behavioral responses stored from contextually similar previous
experiences (Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
While the Smith and DeCoster (2000) model effectively integrated features of
many dual-process theories into a single computational framework, it was soon argued
that neither behavior nor emotion were adequately accounted for within the model due to
the emphasis on information processing and judgment (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Further
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distinguishing impulsive from reflective processes, other researchers proposed that the
two distinct memory systems compete for behavioral control, or otherwise elicit
behavioral responses when the motivational impetus for their activation is particularly
strong (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In alignment with the notion of embodied cognition
which asserts that cognitions are primed by repetitive behaviors (Semin & Smith, 2008),
this integrative model contains both computational and affective-motivational elements.
However, its computational basis remains primary, as Strack and Deutsch (2004)
maintain that affect is merely a byproduct of the reflective and impulsive processes in
accord with the theory of emotion (Russell, 2003), albeit capable of influencing both
approach and avoidance motivations as well as habitual inferences that influence
judgments.
Following the integrative model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the associativepropositional model was developed to further account for System 1 and System 2
evaluative conflicts, suggesting that both dual-process systems have automatic and
controlled aspects (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Using a spatiotemporal
framework, it is argued that associations and propositions refer to what a process is doing
while automatic and controlled refer to when a process has actually been activated
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). In making this distinction, the associativepropositional model argues both that explicit or rational processes need not be intentional
even as implicit or associative processes can be accessed by conscious awareness. By
removing the one-to-one conflation of associative-propositional and automatic-controlled
pairings, the model effectively suggests that System 1 and System 2 processes may
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indeed exist on a measurable continuum whereby each process can be activated by the
other under specific operational conditions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014).
The most valuable contribution of both the impulsive-reflective model (Strack &
Deutsch, 2004) and the associative-propositional model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006) to dual process theorizing is their mutual interest in clarifying the overlapping
conditional elements of System 1 and System 2 processes. Most dual-process theories up
until this point had maintained a certain level of disconnect between dual systems by
positing a separation of the cognitive architecture of each system while providing for
some degree of interaction by means of context-dependent cues. However, the
introduction of affective-motivational components (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and
overlapping conditional elements (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) actually led
eminent dual-process theorists to consider whether a mediating system might serve to
“bridge the gap”, so to speak, between System 1 and System 2 processes (Evans, 2008;
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich et al., 2014). Dual-process theories also abandoned
the terms System 1 and System 2 at this point for the terms Type 1 and Type 2, since the
latter do not insinuate a literal correspondence with discrete brain systems (Stanovich et
al., 2014).
The most current dual-process theories regard the defining feature of Type 1
processing to be its autonomy, meaning all relevant Type 1 processes work independently
of higher-order cognitions and are necessarily triggered by specific context-dependent
cues (Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009). As such, the functional overlap between Type 1 and
Type 2 processes in unidirectional such that Type 2 processes can directly modify or
“override” Type 1 processes, but Type 1 processes do not exert any such functional
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control over Type 2 processes (Stanovich et al., 2014). The stimulus override feature of
System 2 processing is regarded as an executive inhibitory mechanism, interrupting or
suppressing System 1 activation in a top-down manner (Evans, 2008). The substitution
feature of Type 2 processing creates alternative response options when Type 1 responses
have been suppressed, and involves the higher order capacity to use both hypothetical
reasoning to consider alternative possible outcomes and cognitive decoupling to
distinguish between hypothetical simulations and actual sensory representations (Evans,
2007, 2010; Stanovich, 2009, 2011).
By shifting the emphasis away from distinct memory processing systems and
towards a more integrated view of Type 1 and Type 2 features, current theories suggest
that Type 2 processing involves two complementary levels: the reflective and algorithmic
minds (Stanovich et al., 2014). Akin to the suggestion set forth by the philosopher Daniel
Dennett (2002), this tripartite model was a necessary consequence of introducing a
higher-order control mechanism into dual-process theories since the “instructions to
initiate override of Type 1 processing (and to initiate simulation activities) must be
controlled by cognitive machinery at a higher level than the decoupling machinery itself”
(Stanovich et al., 2014, p. 85). So while the algorithmic Type 2 processes are related to
fluid intelligence and cognitive abilities, the reflective Type 2 processes that initiate Type
1 override sequences are related to epistemic dispositions of thought and cognitive styles
(Stanovich et al., 2014).
This bifurcation of Type 2 processing into reflective and algorithmic systems has
an important consequence inasmuch as it reintroduces the notion of cognitive styles and
individual differences into dual-process theory discourse. So long as dual-processes are
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regarded as distinct operating systems there is inadequate room for speculation as to how
individual dispositions or cognitive styles might be understood in a dual-process
framework (Epstein, 2014). However, the introduction of a tripartite structure with
higher-order override capacities for algorithmic and Type 1 processes alters the
theoretical landscape. It also allows for the integration of research findings across both
social and cognitive psychology while opening new discussions in areas such as habit
formation (Evans, 2008; Wood, Labrecque, Lin, & Runger, 2014), free will and
determinism (Baumeister & Bargh, 2014), and morality (Amit, Gottlieb, & Greene,
2014).
Certain avenues of research interest such as metacognition (Greifeneder &
Schwarz, 2014; Schwarz, 2015) and emotion regulation (Sheppes & Gross, 2012) have
been successfully applied in dual-process frameworks as a result, based on theorizing that
such constructs might be best understood in relation to experiential and rational dual
processes in equal measure. Studies on Metacognition, particularly those guided by the
tenets of feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012), indicate that higher order
reflective processing is mediated by both declarative (i.e., algorithmic system)
information as well as experiential (i.e., associative) information (Greifeneder &
Schwarz, 2014). Emotion regulation studies have shown that associative forms of
heuristic-based down regulation not only occur, but are often as effective as those more
deliberative emotion regulation processes which serve as the traditional basis for
understanding up regulated and down regulated strategies (Gallo, Keil, McCulloch,
Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2011; Sheppes & Gross, 2014).
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Such inquiries into metacognitive and emotion regulation processes through the
lens of dual process theory have been made possible by the distinction between
algorithmic processes of fluid intelligence and reflective processes of cognitive styles. As
a natural extension of this new perspective, the notion that the charting of unique dualprocess patterns might lend insight into between-individual personality differences has
also gained broader appeal. This is not to say that all dual process theorists agree that
individual differences in experiential and rational processing can be assessed using a
dual-process framework. On the contrary, many maintain that regardless of introducing a
reflective system through the tripartite model, personality-based assessments of
dispositional dual processing styles remain untenable because the experiential system and
two-part analytic system, although highly interrelated, still do not operate on a
measurable continuum (Evans, 2010, 2013; Stanovich, 2011, 2012).
Instead, cognitive styles apply to the reflective system alone, and therefore
individual differences in cognitive style can only be determined in regards to that
particular system (Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich et al., 2014). The associative foundation of
Type 1 processing means that it operates autonomously to the extent that implicit rules,
conditioned patterns of response, and heuristic principles do not rely on higher-order
control systems to function appropriately (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2012). In effect, it is
claimed that the autonomy and automaticity of the system prevents Type 1 processes
from being considered in terms of dispositional differences because all Type 1 systems
work based upon a universal set of process-based principles regardless of individual
content-based distinctions. The reason for introducing cognitive styles into the modern
tripartite model is therefore not to suggest that dual-process theories can provide new
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insight into a dual-process perspective on individual differences, but rather to suggest that
those dispositional styles of cognition which have been long examined in personality and
social psychology can now be effectively located within the structure of tripartite models.
By introducing a new operating principle into the computational tripartite model,
research evidence of variations in specific processing capacities that were once viewed as
functioning within a single control system are now understood to be a result of operations
in separate control systems. For example, scores on general intelligence tests and
dispositional constructs assessed using the five-factor model of personality have always
been weakly or moderately correlated (Austin & Deary, 2002; Bates & Shieles, 2003;
Kanazawa, 2004). The tripartite model serves to explain this as a consequence of general
intelligence operating within the algorithmic Type 2 system and dispositional personality
factors operating in the reflective Type 2 system (Stanovich, 2012). Intelligence is thus
viewed as a function of the algorithmic mind in particular, rather than as a central feature
of the mind in general.
Another dispositional construct of personality which has shown weak correlations
with general intelligence is need for cognition, or the dispositional tendency towards, and
enjoyment of, effortful thinking (Epstein, 1996; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Whereas a high
need for cognition indicates a tendency to “seek, acquire, think about, and reflect back on
information to make sense of stimuli, relationships, and events in the world,” a low need
for cognition indicates a tendency to “rely on others (e.g., celebrities and experts),
cognitive heuristics, or social comparison processes to provide this structure” (Cacioppo,
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, p. 198). As a thinking disposition, the tripartite model
maintains that the need for cognition construct is embedded in the reflective mind as a
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high-intensity processing system linked to metacognition (Greifeneder & Schwarz, 2014)
and propositional evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) was thus developed to
assess effortful cognitive tendencies as a stable dispositional trait rather than a situational
variable. The dual-process theories that immediately followed drew some degree of
inspiration and insight from this construct insofar as it reflects an implicit distinction
between heuristic and rational processes (Epstein, 2014). However, its actual integration
into those traditional dual-process theories was inhibited by its individual differences
foundation. It was not until the development of the tripartite model and its addition of the
reflective mind some twenty-five years later that the need for cognition construct was
finally integrated into mainstream dual-process theories (Epstein, 2014). As has been
shown, the proposed benefit of a tripartite view on dual-processing is its enhanced range
of conceptual inclusiveness, particularly when compared with the natural limitations
imposed by a bifurcated dual process model.
However, a relative outlier in the dual-process community of social psychology
theorists used the need for cognition construct much earlier as the foundation for an
individual differences measure of dual-processing tendencies. With the development of
cognitive-experiential self theory, Epstein (1990) sought to create a modified version of
the Need for Cognition Scale to gauge dispositional tendencies in rationality while
simultaneously developing the Faith in Intuition Scale (FI) as a conceptual counterpoint
assessment to measure dispositional experiential tendencies. The conceptual positioning
of cognitive-experiential self theory, now called cognitive-experiential theory (CET;
Epstein, 2014), was such that it conflicted with most of the early dual-process theories
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due to its emphasis on the continuity of rational-analytic (i.e., Type 2) and experientialintuitive (i.e., Type 1) processing capacities. Rather than regard the two as distinct
systems as other theorists were wont to do, CET held that the rational and intuitive
systems were not only highly integrated, but were nuanced enough to warrant an
examination of each system in terms of individual differences (Epstein, 2014).
The design of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; (Epstein et al., 1996)
clearly reflects this perspective, as the development of an experiential scale presupposes
that Type 1 associative processes reflect unique dispositional traits rather than function as
a form of universal processing capacities. According to CET, this perspective becomes
accessible by regarding both experiential-intuitive and rational-analytic processes as
cognitive systems, but then further allowing that experiential processing is intimately
related to affect as an emotionally driven cognitive system (Epstein, 2003). The overlap
prescribed to the systems in CET is such that rational and experiential processes serve to
jointly influence all behaviors, even as their interaction provides the grounds for the likes
of metaphors, creativity, and wisdom (Epstein, 1994, 2014; Epstein et al., 1996).
Whereas most dual-process theories have sought to limit the number of
descriptive factors used to distinguish Type 1 and Type 2 processes, CET has used its
experiential and affective foundation to expand the list considerably. Akin to other dual
process theories, CET maintains that the experiential-intuitive Type 1 system is indeed
“fast, effortless, automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and
undemanding of working memory”, while the rational-analytic type 2 system is “slow,
effortful, controlled, conscious, flexible, decontextualized, and demanding of working
memory” (Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 1). However, CET goes further by including
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hedonic principles, an outcome-oriented focus, and image-based encoding in the
experiential system, while including logic-reality principles, a process-oriented focus, and
symbolic-linguistic encoding in the rational system (Epstein, 2003).
Based on aspects of this list, it is perhaps unsurprising that elements of
psychodynamic theory are a mainstay of CET from its origins (Epstein, 1984) through to
its most current iteration (Epstein, 2014). Regardless of its conceptual underpinnings,
however, CET remains a dual-process theory quite distinct from traditional
psychodynamic approaches due to the integrative nature of its dual systems. The overlap
of the hedonic-principled experiential system and reality-principled rational system is
mediated by the balancing of four basic needs as advanced by other major theorists: to
maximize pleasure and minimize pain (Freud, 1900/1953), to experience relatedness
(Bowlby, 1988), to maintain a coherent and stable conceptual system of self (Rogers,
1951), and to enhance self-esteem (Allport, 1961). Each of these basic needs are met by
means of a coordinated effort between experiential and rational systems, even as a lack of
coordination leads to negative psychological consequences due to personality disruption
(Epstein, 2003).
From this idea that multiple psychological needs are fulfilled by the balancing of
dual-process systems arises the obvious question as to how each system uniquely
influences needs fulfillment. According to CET, the experiential-intuitive and rationalanalytic processes are distinct yet overlapping information processing modalities, which
indicates that each lends a particular set of computational systems to the task of needs
fulfillment (Epstein, 2014). It further indicates that adaptive as well as maladaptive needs
fulfillment strategies can arise from the use of either system. There is no sense in which
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one system is “superior” to the other, as each operates to fulfill the basic psychological
needs but serve this purpose by means of a complex yet integrated functional apparatus.
Albeit by quite different means, both have evolved to enhance organismic survival as
well as stability, and have an equal capacity to formulate adaptive responses under a
variety of environmental conditions (Epstein, 2003; Evans, 2009).
It is at precisely this point that the orientation model (Wilkinson, 2015) intercedes
to suggest that understanding how dispositional tendencies to utilize one system or the
other, particularly under conditions of stress, might lend insight into both the adaptive
and maladaptive habitual patterns employed by clients to resolve psychological conflicts
and to enhance needs fulfillment. While CET has extended a similar proposition in terms
of psychotherapeutic approaches, its emphasis has been specifically directed towards
clinical methods for instantiating therapeutic changes to the experiential system (Epstein,
2014). It is surmised that such changes can occur either by “the use of the rational system
to correct and train the experiential system,” or by “the provision of emotionally
significant corrective experiences, communicating with the experiential system in its own
medium” (Epstein, 2003, p. 176).
As a psychodynamic theory of personality, CET asserts that its tenets can provide
a specific and comprehensive approach to counseling and psychotherapy. It thus serves as
both a theoretical framework of personality and a practical methodology for clinical
practices. The orientation model makes no such claims about global personality, as its
primary function is to combine the dual-process framework with established scientific
knowledge on dispositional characteristics to elucidate how the use of habitual strategies
can either impede or facilitate needs fulfillment and adaptive functioning (Wilkinson,
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2015). Its emphasis is thus on the practical consequences of adaptive and maladaptive
dual-processing rather than a comprehensive explanation of personality formation
(Epstein, 2014).
Furthermore, it approaches the issue of clinical methodology from an alternative
and as yet unexamined angle, namely within a humanistic-existential counseling
approach. In this respect, the orientation model was designed to inform counselors on
general patterns of client processing rather than be applied as part of a comprehensive
diagnostic taxonomy for psychopathologies and symptom evaluation (Epstein, 2003,
2014). The orientation model works within the confines of a more restrictive set of
guiding principles than CET, and is meant to be applied in a far more particular way.
Theoretical Stance of the Orientation Model
The orientation model is a humanistic-existential assessment tool for clinical use
that gives humanistic counselors a means by which to determine the influence of client
dispositional traits on adaptive functioning without resorting to diagnostic labels or other
reductionist practices. The most basic, shared tenet of dual process theories is the notion
of dual processing itself. Whether discussed in terms of divergent systems with separate
processing capacities, parallel systems with overlapping functions, or tripartite systems
with hierarchical processing conditions, all dual-process theories presuppose that these
systems impart particular environmental advantages by means of uniquely adaptive
processing strategies. From this fundamental position, the orientation model asserts that
understanding how individuals uniquely differ in the expression and use of dual
processing capacities can benefit personal development, insight, and self-awareness. By
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extension, equipping counselors with an assessment tool for recognizing such withinindividual differences can confer the same basic advantages in the clinical realm.
So dual process theories consistently maintain that two processing capacities are
at work in all human activities. A diverse array of terms have been applied to each
processing system (for a review, see Stanovich, West, and Toplak, 2014). The first set of
processes include terms such as System 1, Type 1, heuristic, automatic, implicit,
reflexive, associative, stimulus-bound, intuitive, and experiential. The second set of
processes have been referenced as System 2, Type 2, systematic, explicit, rule-based,
conscious, rational, analytic, higher-order, and propositional. For the purposes of the
orientation model, two particular terms are applied in all references to dual-processing
systems: experiential and analytic. These have been chosen primarily as a means of
ensuring internal consistency, but also due to the relative ease with which such terms
might be assimilated into professional counseling practices and discourse.
Dispositional Analytic Processes
The analytic system uses inferential and deductive cognitive processes to solve
problems aid in decision-making, and optimize outcomes. Logic and language form the
basis of its processing capacity, and in this respect it operates sequentially and encodes
information in terms of abstract symbols like words and numbers. Accurate evaluation is
therefore a primary function of the analytic system, whereby it assesses causal
relationships between stimuli and outcomes in order to enhance the predictive capabilities
of the individual. In this respect, the ability to predict future outcomes also serves as a
control mechanism, providing a means by which an individual can consciously learn
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ways to increase or decrease the probability of a given outcome by enacting certain
behaviors and manipulating environmental conditions.
Such predictive, cause-and-effect abilities are generally slow by processing
standards, requiring considerable cognitive effort and consuming substantial cognitive
resources. Guided by the reality principle, the analytic system is motivated by the
accuracy of inferential logic and therefore emphasizes objective reasoning over
subjective notions such as desires or feelings. In this respect, it is a highly differentiated,
integrated, and organized system that operates from the level of adaptive principles,
making it highly prone to conscious change based solely on insight and evidence. The
analytic system is also oriented towards the delay of action, such that the hope or promise
of future rewards can be prioritized over immediate gratification. Generally affect-free, it
works from cost-benefit analyses in this respect since it remains uninfluenced by the
emotional cues that drive behavioral impulsivity.
Dispositional Experiential Processes
Just like the analytic system, the experiential system functions to solve problems,
aid in decision making, and optimize outcomes. However, it does so through the use of
associative, heuristic, and affect-imbued cognitive processes that have been learned
automatically through experience rather than deduced through a logical apparatus. Its
processing capacity is primarily imagery-based, encoding information non-verbally rather
than through abstract symbols. Pattern recognition is a primary function of the
experiential system, which operates unconsciously and yet “nevertheless guides thought
and inquiry towards a hunch or hypothesis about the nature of the coherence in question”
(p. 23). Unconscious pattern recognition provides a means by which to assess threats and
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opportunities in the environment, making emotional cues and intuitive prompts important
survival tools that are laden with rapidly-processed information.
Such associative thinking is rapid by processing standards, consumes few
cognitive resources, and requires little cognitive effort as a result. The hedonic principle
guides the experiential system, as the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain serve an
adaptive evolutionary function. However, it is a crudely integrated system that operates in
a context-specific, categorical, and disorganized manner, making it highly susceptible to
biases and misinterpretations. It is also highly resistant to change, as the encoding process
for the experiential system requires either rote repetitiveness to shift habitual responses or
the onset of affectively-intense experiences to reorganize its operating conditions. As an
associative and affect-driven system, its rapid processing capacity orients it towards
impulsive, habitual, or otherwise immediate actions that may or may not be adaptive
under a given set of circumstances. However, the automatic associations that are derived
from observation are often highly accurate representations of the environment, making
the experiential system a powerful tool for assessment and action.
Conceptual Implications for Counseling
The primary benefit of the orientation model is its unique assessment of client
dual-processing dispositions related to the cognitive, attachment, empathic, and
introspective constructs. Rather than being a substitute for other assessments or clinical
judgment, it acts as an informational supplement which can enhance both in the treatment
process. Integrative, assimilative, trans-theoretical and multi-theoretical models of
psychotherapy provide specific formulas for thinking about presenting problems and goal
development (Norcross & Goldfried, 2005). However, the orientation model and measure
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provide informative data sets about dispositional client tendencies which can be applied
within such formulas for thinking about presenting problems and goal development.
Bringing together a series of dispositional measures from different psychological
theories into a cohesive framework for the purpose of case conceptualization can provide
counselors with extremely relevant client information prior to treatment. The orientation
model and its corresponding assessment aim to merge these notable and distinctive
theories into a system specifically designed for counselors to use in gauging important
individual differences in client behavioral patterns. By incorporating theoretically-derived
measures into a dual processing framework, counselors can determine important client
variables within an easily conceptualized thinking/feeling spectrum. Assessment results
can be readily applied in counseling, lending counselors information on client attributes
that support the interpretation of behaviors, symptoms, and presenting problems.
A significant portion of the case conceptualization process involves making
calculated interpretations of client behaviors and motivations based on widely varying
degrees of client-provided information (Falvey, 2001). Whether incorporating results
from assessment tools or comparing and contrasting verbal reports and observations of
client non-verbal behaviors, counselors must attempt to conceptualize the client's
experience by combining clinical experience, theoretical viewpoints, cognitive heuristics,
and intuitive leanings to arrive at an accurate clinical judgment (Falvey, 2001;
Kleinmuntz, 1990). Although aspects of both the art and the science of counseling merge
in this process of interpretation, there is much to be said for trading anecdotal evidence
for empirical data when possible. Similar to how clinical symptoms are monitored
through highly specified measures, the orientation model provides counselors with trans-
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diagnostic information on client dispositional characteristics that can be readily applied in
the process of case conceptualization.
Existential Framework of the Orientation Model
Whereas dual-processing provides the theoretical foundation for the orientation
model and its constructs, an existential framework serves as the conceptual basis for
adopting each particular construct within the model. In accordance with the notion of
Lebenswelt, or phenomenological lifeworld (Husserl, 1936/1970), the orientation model
frames individual processing styles in terms of three dimensions of human experience.
These include the Umwelt or physical world, the Mitwelt or social world, and the
Eigenwelt or personal world (Binswanger, 1946/1958). As applied in existential
psychology, therapists are encouraged to actively seek understanding around each of the
three dimensions so as to gain insight into the phenomenological lifeworld of clients
(May, 1967). It has also been asserted that each dimension provides unique information
on client styles of interpretation and interaction rooted in dual-processing (Wilkinson,
2015).
Rather than perceive these dimensions as disparate or otherwise disconnected
aspects of persons, each is inextricably linked by means of intentionality (May, 1969).
Through an existential-phenomenological lens, intentionality “refers to a state of being,
and involves, to a greater or lesser degree, the totality of the person’s orientation to the
world at that time” (May, 1969, p. 234). In this respect, the phrase “human experience” is
understood to involve structures of consciousness such that the entirety of experiential
phenomena – thoughts, feelings, behaviors, motivations, understandings, imaginings, and
the like – are included (Husserl, 1936/1970). So from the standpoint of a
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phenomenological investigation of intentionality, Umwelt is the conscious inner-world,
Eigenwelt is the unconscious inner-world, and Mitwelt is the with-world of social
relationships with others (Diamond, 2014; May, 1969).
In line with the humanistic penchant for considering the whole person, then,
explorations of the Lebenswelt from an existential perspective must involve all
dimensions of the phenomenological lifeworld. Furthermore, each dimension must be
viewed with an understanding that intentionality is an encompassing subjective
experience of both the conscious and unconscious inner world as well as the point of
interface and interpretation of others in the social world (Diamond, 2014). In other words,
the phenomenological lifeworld is a consequence of that fundamental property of
consciousness known as intentionality, which is in turn understood in the frame of
existential inquiry to be composed of multiple experiential dimensions. Rather than view
the dimensions of Lebenswelt as three disconnected aspects of human consciousness, it is
perhaps more appropriate to suggest that each represents a particular mode of conscious
engagement with the world.
By regarding the phenomenological lifeworld dimensions as modes of conscious
engagement rather than distinct aspects of consciousness, a question arises as to how
subjective experience is mediated between, or transitions among, each of the modes.
Intentionality is taken to be an indivisible structure of conscious experience in the
existential and phenomenological traditions (Diamond, 2014; Husserl, 1936/1970; May,
1969), which contributes to the humanistic ideal of the whole person as a seeking towards
stability and coherence in self-structures (Rogers, 1951). This would seem to suggest a
sense in which lifeworld dimensions are fluid, since maintaining the coherence of
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conceptual systems requires an ability to integrate highly disparate information
processing inputs into a meaningful gestalt. Without such an integrative capacity our
experiences would essentially be fractured or disorganized rather than stable or coherent,
resulting in threats to the phenomenal self (Snygg & Combs, 1949).
The orientation model proposes that the lifeworld dimensions can be understood
in relation to one another by considering how those psychological capacities serve as
mediators of the conscious engagement modes. In other words, the tendency towards
systemic coherence of the phenomenological lifeworld gives rise to certain facilitative
processing capacities, each of which are regarded as a natural consequence of interaction
among the dimensions. As seen in the diagram for the orientation model (Figure 1), each
of the Lebenswelt dimensions serves as a sort of “cornerstone” of subjective human
experience. The orientation model constructs, however, represent distinct methods of
interpreting subjective experiences both within and between those phenomenological
lifeworld dimensions. Insofar as these dimensions are particular modes of conscious
engagement which combine to represent a personal worldview, the orientation model
constructs are particular methods by which we attempt to process the relationship
between those worldviews so as to maintain the stability of our self-structure (Wilkinson,
2015).
Therefore, the orientation model posits four styles of interpretation derived from
the combined elements of lifeworld dimensions (Wilkinson, 2015). The cognitive
orientation is an interpretation of personal experience in contact with the physical world,
or the mediating consequence of the inner unconscious world (i.e., Eigenwelt) combining
with the inner conscious world (i.e., Umwelt). The attachment orientation is an
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interpretation of personal experience in contact with other subjects, or the mediating
consequence of the inner unconscious world (i.e., Eigenwelt) combining with the social
with-world of others (i.e., Mitwelt). The empathic orientation is an interpretation of how
other subjects experience the physical world, or the mediating consequence of the inner
conscious world (i.e., Umwelt) combining with the social with-world of others (i.e.,
Mitwelt). One conceptual outlier, the introspective orientation, is regarded as a direct
indication of how memory and imagination are habitually utilized to process personal
experiences within the Eigenwelt, or inner unconscious world of introspective processing
(Wilkinson, 2015).
Gathering information on client worldviews may therefore grant counselors the
opportunity to discern unique styles of interpretation that directly influence the
phenomenal lifeworld experience of those clients. While the relationship between
presenting problems and worldviews is not such that direct predictions can be made,
information about particular worldviews can certainly provide a lens through which to
interpret presenting problems and clinically relevant symptoms. The orientation model is
guided by this basic supposition and asserts that a basic understanding of dispositional
dual-processing styles actually contextualizes, or provides a general rationale for, many
of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that clients present with in counseling. As such,
the active identification of habitual client tendencies can support strengths-based
therapeutic approaches which capitalize on adaptive client strategies and modify those
areas in need of growth.
A caveat is important to note at this juncture, as the orientation model diagram is
not meant to be a representation of the notion of self or other such related constructs. The
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dynamic nature of human experience involves a complex and diverse range of factors that
can neither be reduced to nor adequately encompassed within an applied psychological
model, and thus the orientation model itself is not designed to signify a complete notion
of either self or personality. Rather, the orientation model diagram serves as a visual
representation of how dispositional tendencies may relate to the proposed dimensions of
human experience set forth by existential notions of the Lebenswelt, or phenomenological
lifeworld of individuals.
Constructs of the Orientation Model
Each measure of the orientation model was chosen based on distinct conceptual
parallels to the cognitive and experiential positions found in dual process theories.
Although an existential framework provides the grounds for including each broad
construct in the model, it remains necessary to clearly define each construct in theoretical
terms. The orientation model asserts that a dual process approach to the four existential
orientations can be interpreted through four corresponding theoretical lenses. These
include the cognitive orientation of cognitive-experiential theory (Epstein, 2014), the
attachment orientation of differentiation of self theory (Bowen, 1978), the empathic
orientation of the social-cognitive simulation theory of empathy (Rameson & Lieberman,
2009), and the introspective orientation of objective self-awareness theory (Duval &
Wicklund, 1972).
The cognitive orientation, founded upon Cognitive-Experiential Theory (CET;
Epstein, 2014), distinguishes between analytic and experiential modes of information
processing, with clinical implications in terms of how individuals generally conceptualize
and communicate their worldviews. Dual process theories generally maintain that
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experiential processing represents a default capacity for handling daily functions whereas
analytic processing is primed by new or unexpected situations or environmental
conditions. As an account of individual differences, CET maintains that experiential and
analytic processing capacities differ widely between-individuals, and represent distinct
within-individual processing styles (Epstein, 2014). Furthermore, CET suggests that
anxiety-provoking or otherwise stressful situations tend to exacerbate habitual processing
tendencies, leading individuals to the preferential use of either experiential or analytic
capacities under stressful conditions.
The attachment orientation, derived from Differentiation of Self Theory (DST;
Bowen, 1978), distinguishes between emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity with
clinical implications in terms of interpersonal interactions, relationship difficulties, and
views on relational intimacy and autonomy. Emphasizing the psychological importance
of individuation, differentiation of self suggests that cognitive and emotional functioning
is optimized by an ability to maintain healthy interpersonal boundaries (Bowen, 1976).
As a relational construct, differentiation also suggests an ability to clearly distinguish
between a sense of oneself and the experiences of others, such that the individual takes
responsibility for their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors without experiencing undue
accountability for the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others (Bowen, 1978).
Furthermore, DST asserts that any personal vulnerability to emotional reactivity or
emotional cutoff is naturally exacerbated by stressful interpersonal conditions (Bowen,
1976).
The empathic orientation is based upon the social-cognitive simulation theory of
empathy (Rameson & Lieberman, 2009) which distinguishes between propositional and
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experiential forms of empathy. In this respect, it signifies an interpersonal ability to
conceptualize the perspective of others (i.e., cognitive empathy) and to emotionally
attune to the affective experience of others (i.e., emotional empathy), respectively.
According to simulation theories of mind, accurate empathy stems from an ability to
attribute mental states to others and infer potential intentions through a dynamic process
of mental simulation or modeling (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Social-cognitive simulation
theory suggests that such mental modeling can occur in either an experiential “as-if”
mode consisting of affective and cognitive conditions, or a propositional mode composed
of controlled meta-cognitions without affect (Rameson & Lieberman, 2009).
The introspective orientation takes its mark from objective self-awareness theory
(OSA; Wicklund & Duval, 1972), which asserts that self-focused attention is a primary
feature of human consciousness and a requisite condition of self-awareness. Variations in
self-attentiveness as a state-based or situational tendency are regarded as an important
aspect of self-consciousness, whereby an individual takes oneself as an object of
awareness rather than a subject of first-person, immersive experience (Silvia & Duval,
2001). Additionally, OSA provides a conceptual framework for exploring trait-based or
dispositional tendencies in the use of self-focused attention. Reflection and rumination
are introspective methods of assessing and resolving self-standard discrepancies, and
individual differences in the use of these constructs lend insight into how introspective
strategies influence adjustment and coping (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). As such, each
signifies a particular tendency to attend to introspected events based on intellectual
curiosity about the self and sensing threats directed toward the self, respectively.
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In the following section, each of the orientation modes are discussed in terms of
the theoretical tenets on which they are founded as well as the corresponding constructs
that bridge the gap between each theory and the dual-process framework. Each of these
particular sets of constructs were chosen to represent the overarching theories because
they appear to operate according to dual-process principles of analytic and experiential
processing and they each have well-established, empirically-validated measures that have
been developed using confirmatory factor analysis. For the empathic and introspective
orientations, additional 2x2 models taken from the literature have been included to draw
attention to the potentially robust descriptive power of each set of constructs. Finally,
implications for counseling are briefly discussed.
Cognitive Orientation: Analytic
& Experiential Processes
It is important to recognize that a key difference between CET and other current
dual-process theories is that CET claims that the experiential and analytic systems are
both types and styles of cognitive processing (Epstein, 1994). In other words, each system
functions as part of the immutable cognitive architecture, but can also be measured in
terms of individual differences on a continuum of dispositional cognition styles (Epstein,
1999, 2003). This position stands in stark contrast to many dual-process theories which
assert that the cognitive architecture does not reflect stable personality traits (Evans,
2009). As a consequence, dual-process theorists that emphasize system types are
generally unwilling to suggest that dispositional styles of processing can be derived by
means of assessments or measures (Evans, 2009). In contrast, CET asserts that the value
of dual-process theory lies in its ability to explain individual differences.

53
Therefore, CET distinguishes between the analytic and experiential aspects of
human dual-processing using an individual-differences measure to assess how often these
interdependent but qualitatively distinct cognitive capacities are typically used. Mounting
evidence suggests that while both systems regularly contribute to daily functioning,
individuals tend to preferentially rely on one over the other, particularly when under
stress (Epstein, 2014; Pacini & Epstein, 1996). CET provides a theoretical framework for
understanding why we encounter such remarkable individual variations in analytic and
experiential processing, and has provided a wealth of insight into otherwise discrepant
empirical outcomes related to coping, adjustment, intimacy, individuation, optimism,
stereotypical thinking, and problem solving (Epstein, 2014).
While the experiential system operates in tandem with affective processing, it is
not reducible to affect because it is a cognitive system. Affect influences cognitive
processes through what CET refers to as vibes, or a subset of vague feelings that are
difficult to articulate yet are not beyond immediate awareness. Positive vibes can include
feelings of gratification, calmness, anticipation, and well-being, while negative vibes can
include feelings of edginess, tension, apprehension, agitation, or disquietude (Epstein,
2003). This is quite similar to phenomenological notions of embodiment (Merleau-Ponty,
1962), and inheres within the “felt sense” of experiential psychotherapy (Gendlin, 1974)
and the “bodily” (Yontef, 1979) or “gut” (Kepner, 2003) feelings of gestalt approaches.
Such vibes are an expression of preconscious awareness, or the recognition of patterns in
our immediate experience that evoke subtle memories of similar past experiences
(Epstein, 2003).

54
The analytic translation of such experiential vibes results in explanations and, at
times, rationalizations that can interfere with the interpretation of these often informative
subsets of feelings (Epstein, 2014). This is not meant to downplay the value of analytic
processing in counseling, as reasoning and evidence maintain a crucial role in the
development of self-awareness and insight. Instead, it is meant to highlight the value of
experiential processing from a humanistic-existential perspective. CET asserts that by
understanding both how the experiential system operates and how to interpret its cues,
more effective cognitive processing can take place that improves mental health outcomes.
Insofar as creativity, empathy, and wisdom may arise from the interplay of analytic and
experiential processing (Epstein, 2003), counselors can apply their knowledge of how
clients preferentially use each system to develop treatment approaches that improve the
balanced use of the interconnected and equally important styles of cognition.
Attachment Orientation: Processes of
Emotional Cutoff & Emotional
Reactivity
Bowen (1978) established differentiation of self theory (DST) to highlight the
influence of interpersonal relationships on intrapersonal functioning, suggesting that
individuation contributes to healthy cognitive and emotional outcomes. Higher levels of
differentiation are regarded as adaptive, and thus individuation reflects an enhanced
capacity for personal autonomy, self-confidence, and authenticity (Bowen, 1978). Lower
levels of differentiation are a consequence of pressure towards in-group conformity,
resulting in a desire for acceptance and approval-seeking that can stymie personal
development (Bowen, 1978). While emotional interdependence is viewed as an important
aspect of human functioning, DST suggests that the highly differentiated individual
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places a realistic sense of value on interpersonal relationships without allowing the
emotionality of conflict or suggestion to interfere with personal decision-making (Bowe,
1978). Effectively navigating relationships requires an ability to rationally distinguish
oneself from others, even as it requires that one recognize when reliance on others is
adaptive.
According to Skowron and Dendy (2004), DST also suggests that one's level of
adaptive intellectual and emotional individuation has far-reaching implications in terms
of dispositional attachment styles. In alignment with attachment theory research, the
concept of differentiation is largely descriptive rather than explanatory and emphasizes
the impact of family dynamics on habitual interpersonal response patterns, emotional
stability, and autonomous functioning (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). Just as maladaptive
patterns of attachment are considered in terms of excessive approach and avoidance
tendencies, the maladaptive consequences of differentiation are separated into the
approach style of emotional reactivity and the avoidance style of emotional cutoff
(Skowron & Dendy, 2004). As such, emotional reactivity stems from anxious or
preoccupied attachment styles, while emotional cutoff is related to avoidant and
dismissing attachment styles (Skowron & Dendy, 2004).
As dispositional responses to interpersonal conflict, both emotional reactivity and
emotional cutoff are viewed as harmful to the development of intimacy and autonomy
(Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). Emotional reactivity is related to the chronic anxiety and
worry associated with a preoccupied attachment style, and reflects the habitual tendency
towards active and aggressive responses to relational conflict (Skowron & Dendy, 2004).
Emotional cutoff was modified from the cross-generational concept of differentiation to

56
reflect habitual tendencies towards avoidant, passive, and passive-aggressive behaviors
which hinder both intimacy and autonomy formation (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). Both
emotional reactivity and emotional cutoff are methods of self-regulation implemented
when an insecurely attached individual faces relational conflict.
Perfect self-differentiation is rightly considered an unattainable ideal, as the
degree to which an individual distinguishes between thinking and feeling processes varies
based on a multitude of factors (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). However, enhancing selfdifferentiation nestles comfortably within the ideological parameters of counseling.
Underlying issues of intimacy and autonomy are often key components in
conceptualizing cases and developing therapeutic goals, even though they are usually not
brought forth directly as a presenting concern by clients. The concepts are highly
inclusive, representing a broad array of situational factors while simultaneously distilling
the foundational patterns to which many interpersonal problems may be attributed.
Incorporating a dual process approach to attachment through the concept of selfdifferentiation can provide counselors with extremely relevant information about how
habitual client dispositional tendencies negatively impact their pursuit of intimacy and
autonomy.
Empathic Orientation: Cognitive
& Emotional Processes
The question of how best to define the concept of empathy has resulted in
considerable debate over the last forty years, with theorists historically emphasizing
cognitive aspects (e.g., Hogan, 1969), affective aspects (e.g., Stotland, 1969), or some
combination therein (e.g., Davis, 1980; Smith, 2006) when building empathy models.
While it is widely agreed that empathy involves some process of understanding and being
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sensitive to the mental and emotional state of others, there is widespread disagreement as
to how this system operates (Smith, 2006). Cognitive empathy is regarded by many as
synonymous with perspective taking (Davis, 1996), although there is little agreement on
the process by which such a cognitive phenomenon occurs. Affective empathy is
generally considered a vital aspect of both infant and adult attachment (Vreek & van der
Mark, 2003), while both behavioral and neurological observations point to an affective
empathic response in animals ranging from dolphins to rats (Preston & de Waal, 2002).
The integrative dual process model of empathy suggests that seven distinct
models have been developed in the literature to explain how cognitive and affective
empathy interact to balance selfish and altruistic behaviors (Smith, 2006). The integrative
model simply outlines how each can be understood from a dual processing approach to
empathy. According to this integrative model, separate but complementary cognitive and
affective empathy systems should provide an evolutionarily adaptive advantage in the
complex world of human interactions (Smith, 2006). It also provides a spectrum-style
framework for conceptualizing individual differences based on the degree of integration
between cognitive and emotional empathy systems, The 2x2 model includes cognitive
empathy deficit (low cognitive empathy, high emotional empathy), emotional empathy
deficit (low emotional empathy, high cognitive empathy), general empathy deficit (low
cognitive empathy, low emotional empathy), and general empathy surfeit (high cognitive
empathy, high emotional empathy).
Other researchers are actively addressing this line of thought, developing new
models which integrate cognitive and affective neuroscientific views of empathy (Boston,
2007). In particular, the social-cognitive simulation theory of empathy distinguishes

58
between experiential and propositional modes of empathy that parallel dual-processing
frameworks and build upon recent advances in neuropsychology (Rameson & Lieberman,
2009). The experiential mode includes affective as well as cognitive components and
“can be thought of as an automatic, affective, stream-of-consciousness experience that
feels like unmediated reality” (p. 101), while the propositional mode is strictly cognitive
insofar as it involves metacognitive evaluations and controlled reasoning (Rameson &
Lieberman, 2009). In line with simulation theories of empathy, both experiential and
propositional modes denote a process of “putting yourself in another’s shoes” (BaronCohen, 1995), or “seeing with the eyes of another, listening with the ears of another, and
feeling with the heart of another” (Adler, 1928). It suggests that empathic simulations are
a necessary precondition for effective interpersonal socialization, behavioral prediction,
and motivational explanation (Gordon, 1995).
The differential outcomes of experiential and propositional empathy result from
the specific functional capacities of their respective dual-processing systems. Arising
from the experiential system, emotional empathy involves attuned responsiveness in a
feeling of connectedness with others (Smith, 2006), or the activation of embodied
emotional states that somatically represent the perceived experience of another (Preston
& de Waal, 2002). Within the analytic system, cognitive empathy involves the insightoriented capacity of perspective-taking (Mooradian, Davis, & Matzler, 2011), or the
activation of mental representations that signify a metacognitive attunement to the
mental-perceptual or subjective motivational experience of others (Preston & de Waal,
2002). Neuroimaging studies have implicated mirror neurons in both empathic processes,
as primarily activated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Rameson & Lieberman,
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2009). A functional divide in this area of the brain indicates that the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex may play an important role in emotional empathy and the dorsal region
may relate to cognitive empathy (Stuss & Levine, 2002).
Avoiding any etiological or interpretive projections, the usefulness of such a
framework for counseling is evident. The functional utility of empathy in interpersonal
relationships has been well-established, not only as an important part of the therapeutic
alliance (Wampold, 2001) but as a positively contributing factor in the general human
ability to cultivate and maintain healthy relationships (Long & Andrews, 1990). A
counselor equipped with knowledge of such dispositional tendencies can more effectively
conceptualize, address and develop treatment plans based on a client's patterns of
empathic responsiveness both within the therapeutic relationship and outside of it.
Additionally, a 2x2 model of social-cognitive empathy has been proposed that could have
implications for counseling practice and research.
Introspective Orientation: Reflective
& Ruminative Processes
Objective Self-Awareness Theory (OSA; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) originated as
a framework to describe state-based situational variances in self-focused attention as a
component of self-reflexive consciousness (Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia, Eichstadt &
Phillips, 2005). The theory holds that attention directed toward the self results in both
conscious awareness of the self and an evaluative process of comparing the self against
standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Phillips, 2013). This objective form of selfawareness is to be contrasted with a subjective form, described in terms of the organism's
direct and undifferentiated engagement in behavior and perception (Silvia & Duval,
2001). It should be noted that this distinction between objective and subjective forms of
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self-awareness does not represent a form of attentional duality since OSA assumes that
attention can either be directed internally (i.e. objective self-awareness) or externally (i.e.
subjective self-awareness) at any given time. OSA maintains that attention is a singular
phenomenon without any identifiable qualities, characteristics, or types.
In response to OSA, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) designed the selfconsciousness scale to measure trait-based dispositional variances in self-focused
attention. Three distinct categories emerged in the process, two of which have become the
foundation for a large body of empirical and theoretical research since that time: public
and private self-consciousness. Akin to OSA, self-consciousness theory (SCT) proposed
that self-focused attention can be either internally or externally directed (Creed & Funder,
1999; Fenigstein, 1987). Yet the content of this internal-external distinction is
fundamentally different from OSA, as public self-consciousness represents self-focused
attention in the form of an external self perceived by others (e.g. the way one walks, the
clothes one wears, etc.) whereas private self-consciousness represents self-focused
attention in the form of an internal self others cannot perceive (e.g. personal thoughts,
beliefs, feelings, etc.). A guiding assumption of SCT is that these are distinct types of
self-directed attention.
Proponents of OSA later contended that distinguishing types or qualities of selffocused attention is conceptually incoherent because attention is “a contentless concept,
without characterizable qualities” (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987, p. 499). It has also been
claimed that the self-consciousness scale utilizes an atheoretical, factor analytic-based
approach that disregards the dynamic cognitive and motivational processes guiding selfawareness by passing descriptive categorical membership off as an explanation for self-
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consciousness (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). It has been well argued that the
advantages of such categorical reductionism for empirical research - particularly those
derived from factor analytic methodologies - are quickly offset when construct validity
issues later arise that call entire lines of research into question (J. Block, 1995; Boyle,
2008). The public and private subscales derived from SCT have been widely used in
research despite pressing concerns over construct validity issues stemming from
motivational confounds in both.
In a meta-analysis relating self-focused attention to negative affect, Mor and
Winquist (2002) cite Ingram's (1990) definition of self-focus as “an awareness of selfreferent, internally generated information that stands in contrast to an awareness of
externally generated information derived through sensory receptors” (p. 156). This clearly
aligns with OSA's conceptualization of objective and subjective self-awareness as a
unitary construct, and contrasts with the public and private forms of attention set forth in
SCT. As such, researchers called for new public and private measures to be developed
due to validity and reliability problems in the self-consciousness scale (Mor & Winquist,
2002). While the public scale has fallen into particular disfavor (Chang, 1998; Silvia &
Duval, 2001; Silvia, Eichstaedt, & Phillips, 2005), the private scale was subsequently
modified or otherwise adapted across multiple models to account for motivation as a
possible component of self-focus (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1998; Creed & Funder,
1998; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, Hickman, & Waddell, 1998).
One such modified version claimed that the self-absorption paradox (i.e.,
heightened self-focus results in both enhanced self-knowledge and psychological
maladjustment) found in empirical results of the private self-consciousness scale is
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attributable to its measuring two different factors: reflection and rumination (Trapnell &
Campbell, 1999). In modifying the theoretical standing of SCT, both the reflectionrumination model of private self-consciousness and the corresponding ReflectionRumination Questionnaire (RRQ) posit an attention x motivation framework (Trapnell
and Campbell, 1999). Therein, reflection is defined as “self-attentiveness motivated by
curiosity or epistemic interest in the self” and rumination as “self-attentiveness motivated
by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; p. 297).
The reflection-rumination model maintains that high levels of reflection or
rumination are indicative of habitual self-focused attention patterns. Epistemic curiosity
signifies the approach-oriented exploratory features of reflection while threat avoidance
denotes the compulsive features of chronic ruminative thought (Trapnell & Campbell,
1999). The positive-negative valence respectively attributed to reflection and rumination
is also consistently applied in the context of non-emotionality for the former and chronic
symptomology for the latter (Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Takano & Tanno,
2009; Watkins, 2008). Similarly, reflection is widely touted as an adaptive capacity of
cognitive foresight (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010; Williams, 2008) whereas rumination
is typically related to maladaptive strategies and neurotic features (Ciesla, 2005; Ito &
Agari, 2003; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999).
It has also been suggested that the reflection/rumination distinction might be
particularly relevant in light of the coping and adjustment literature, bringing approach
and avoidance styles of cognition into a 2x2 model with implications for counseling
practice as well as research (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The four dispositional styles of
introspective cognition that result from this model include sensitizing (high reflection,
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high rumination), repressive (low reflection, low rumination), vulnerable (low reflection,
high rumination), and adaptable (high reflection, low rumination). Counselors equipped
with information on such processes gain insight into how client presenting symptoms and
concerns are fueled by habitual patterns of coping and problem solving.
Summary Statement
The orientation model is designed to provide counselors with a means to assess
client dispositional tendencies related to cognitive processing, attachment, empathic
awareness, and introspection. Conceptualized within a dual process theory framework
and incorporating empirically-validated psychological measures, it is proposed that the
model can be used to determine individual client variations along a rational-intuitive
processing spectrum. As a supplement to clinical judgment and traditional assessments,
the orientation model is meant to enhance case conceptualization practices by providing
information that contextualizes the presenting concerns of clients and the observations of
counselors. It supports therapeutic interventions by assessing for important dispositional
variables that directly contribute to both interpersonal and intrapersonal instability.
Additionally, the orientation model aligns with the guiding philosophies of
humanistic and existential counseling. Operating in tandem with the existential notion of
the Lebenswelt, it frames dispositional dual-processing patterns as the situated lens
through which clients interpret their personal experiences (Wilkinson, 2015). Client
worldviews are understood to mediate how personal experiences are interpreted, which in
turn influences those client thoughts, feelings, and behaviors manifest as presenting
concerns and symptoms in counseling. Each of the orientation model constructs address a
particular aspect of the client worldview that may serve to either protect individuals from,
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or expose them to, adverse states of being in the world. Integrating the orientation model
with a humanistic or existential approach can thus provide those counselors with insight
into how certain habitual dual-processing patterns and cognitive predispositions tend to
influence client interpretations of experience.
Counselors are trained to develop case conceptualizations and treatment plans
using a combination of client self-reports, observational evidence, and clinical judgment.
This process requires that counselors formulate calculated interpretations that blend both
inductive and deductive elements (Falvey, 2001). As an assessment tool for case
conceptualization purposes, the orientation model is intended to supplement this process
of clinical interpretation by contributing empirical data from established psychological
measures that can inform the therapeutic decision-making process. While each of the
individual measures used have been empirically-validated, their supplemental roles
within the conceptual framework of the orientation model have not been validated. This
study was therefore designed to validate the hypothesized relationship among the four
constructs and associated measures as implemented within the orientation model.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
The research methodology for this study is outlined and discussed in this chapter.
It describes the research questions, hypotheses, participants, measures, procedures, and
data analyses that were used in the study. This study investigated whether four distinct
psychological constructs could be conceptually unified to develop a counseling
assessment for case conceptualization and treatment planning purposes. Testing four
instruments that assess distinct psychological constructs, it was hypothesized that both
the direction and the magnitude of relationships among the instrument variables would be
explained using a dual-process theory framework. A non-experimental survey design
using convenience sampling and four self-report measures was employed to examine the
research questions and test the stated hypotheses.
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in various sections of a firstyear seminar course at a medium-sized, Midwestern four-year research university. Based
on aggregate course statistics, all students enrolled in the first-year seminar course were
first-year, first-time college students (N = 452) and identified as 76% Caucasian, 17.9%
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Hispanic, 3.3% Asian, and 2.8% African American. In addition, 66% of participants were
female and 44% were first generation college students.
Inclusion in the research study was restricted to participants 18 or older, and no
additional criteria for inclusion or exclusion was employed. An a priori power analysis
for multivariate analysis comparing three different groups based on six outcome variables
(α = .05, 1-β = .95, f2 = .12) indicated a minimum sample size of N = 114 to protect
against inflated type I error. This approximates the a priori sample size requirement to
conduct the correlation analyses within this study (α = .05, 1-β = .95, r = .3, N = 111) and
was therefore used as the minimum standard for participant recruitment.
There is a long history of debate regarding the use of undergraduate participants
in social science research (Lynch, 1982; Peterson, 2001; Wells, 1993). However, it has
also been well argued that empirical studies designed for theory generalization rather than
outcomes-based applications are appropriate to use with undergraduate populations since
theorized models must go through a rigorous falsification process before being applied in
support of real-world interventions (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981; Cacioppo et al.,
1996). A similar viewpoint arises based on the etic perspective employed across the social
sciences to determine universal human trends in behaviors, personalities, and beliefs
(Cheung, van de Vijver, & Leong, 2011). In terms of dispositional studies more
specifically, personality and social psychology researchers often extrapolate the results of
individual differences studies and trait-based psychometric assessments to heterogeneous
adult populations based on the etic perspective (McCrae & Allik, 2002; Rust &
Golombrok, 2014). As this study was designed for theory generalization stemming from
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the use of individual differences measures, the researcher maintained that use of
undergraduate participants to validate the orientation model was warranted.
Variables
Variables in the proposed model included: (a) rational-cognitive processing,
(b) experiential-cognitive processing, (c) emotional cutoff, (d) emotional reactivity,
(e) cognitive empathy, (f) emotional empathy, (g) reflection, and (h) rumination. The
dependent (response) variables included rational-cognitive processing and experientialcognitive processing. The independent (predictor) variables included emotional cutoff,
emotional reactivity, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, reflection, and rumination.
Stemming from the tenets of the cognitive-experiential theory of dual-processing
(Epstein, 2014), it was proposed that positive relationships would exist between rationalcognitive processing, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflection, as well as
between experiential-cognitive processing, emotional reactivity, emotional empathy, and
rumination (Wilkinson, 2015; see Table 1).

Table 1
Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Relationships among Subscales
Analytic Variables

Experiential Variables

Rational-Cognitive Processing

Experiential-Cognitive Processing

Emotional Cutoff/Attachment Avoidance

Emotional Reactivity/Attachment Anxiety

Cognitive Empathy

Emotional Empathy

Reflective Introspection

Ruminative Introspection
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Both rational-cognitive processing and experiential-cognitive processing were
measured using the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) designed
to assess subject self-perception of dispositional tendencies and general identification
with analytic and intuitive dual-processing systems. Both emotional cutoff and emotional
reactivity were measured using the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R;
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), designed to assess subject self-perception of dispositional
tendencies related to emotional responsiveness in close personal relationships. Both
cognitive empathy and emotional empathy were measured using the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), designed to assess participant self-perception of
dispositional empathic tendencies and conditions of interpersonal awareness. Both
reflection and rumination were measured using the Reflection and Rumination
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), designed to assess participant selfperception of dispositional self-focused attention as a function of either intellectual
curiosity or chronic anxiety.
Research Questions
Q1

Is there a linear relationship between the cognitive orientation subscales
(as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation subscales (as
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation subscales (as measured
by the IRI), or the introspective orientation subscales (as measured by the
RRQ)?

H1a

No significant relationship will exist between cognitive orientation
subscales.

H1b

A significant positive relationship will exist for attachment orientation
subscales.

H1c

A significant positive relationship will exist for empathic orientation
subscales.
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H1d

No significant relationship will exist between introspective orientation
subscales.

Q2

Is there a relationship between analytic process subscales and experiential
process subscales as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the
REI, DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ?

H2a

Positive relationships will exist across the four analytic process subscales.

H2b

Positive relationships will exist across the four experiential process
subscales.

Q3

How do attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety, as measured by the
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale
of the REI?

H3a

For attachment avoidance scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

H3b

For attachment anxiety in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean will be
larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, which
will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

Q4

How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores)
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the
REI?

H4a

For cognitive empathy scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the mean
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores,
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

H4b

For emotional empathy scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores,
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

Q5

How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition
subscale of the REI?

H5a

For reflective introspection scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.
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H5b

For ruminative introspection scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.
Instruments

Insofar as psychological models typically incorporate a hypothesis-driven,
theoretical foundation within which the model is grounded, static and atheoretical
accounts of dispositional personality do not provide strong working models of individual
psychological experience for clinical use (J. Block, 1995; Boyle, 2008; Cervone, 2005).
Lack of such a structure might explain why such measures do not translate into solid
frameworks for clinical use (Boyle, 2008; Epstein, 2010). In light of this possibility, a
distinction should be made here between individual-difference measures seen in the
personality literature and those found in other areas of counseling and psychology. The
personality approach to measurement is most often exploratory factor analytic and
variable-center focused, using an inter-individual, population variation format to develop
categories and constructs from a large set of variables which portend to hold both
descriptive and explanatory power (J. Block, 1995; Cervone, 2005). With historical and
motivational nuances excluded, the uniqueness of the person is largely removed from the
equation and replaced with broadly comparative, static behavioral definitions that are
difficult to translate into subjective experiential terms (J. Block, 1995; Boyle, 2008).
Individual difference measures within other arenas of the counseling and
psychology literature, however, are generally set within a model-based theoretical
framework and strive to both examine and delineate well-defined intra-individual
psychological phenomena via confirmatory factor analysis (Epstein, 2010). In terms of
applicability for counseling, measures of this sort have a great deal to offer. Framing such
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measures within associated models provides a theoretical context for the definitional
parameters used (J. Block, 1995), thereby enhancing their functional utility in case
conceptualizations. Absent the context of a theoretical model, we are left to interpret the
results of a measure in a fairly arbitrary manner, thereby reducing its functional utility
and subsequent usefulness in the counseling setting. Confirmatory factor analytic (CFA)
measures of intra-individual differences carry a great deal more descriptive power
because they are rooted in established theoretical frameworks which provide a solid
foundation for real world applicability, the interpretation of maladaptive behaviors, and
case conceptualization as a result. Each of the following measures was developed using
CFA. Permission has been granted from the authors of the instruments for their use.
Rational-Experiential Inventory
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) was designed to
assess individual differences in the habitual use of rational and experiential cognitions as
a function of dual-processing capacities. It combines a modified version of the Need for
Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) with a new experiential measure called
the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale. While a more recent version of the REI includes
additional sub-dimensions for both the NFC scale and the FI scale (Pacini & Epstein,
1999), the original rational-experiential structure of the REI fulfill the purposes set forth
in the orientation model. The REI includes two primary long forms (REI-59, Epstein et
al., 1996; REI-40 Norris, Pacini & Epstein, 1998), and a 10-item short form version
(REI-SF, Epstein et al., 1996).
The REI-SF was used for this study and includes 10 items on a five-point Likert
scale ranging from not very true of me to very true of me. (Epstein et al., 1996). The NFC
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subscale includes five items such as “I prefer to challenge my thinking abilities rather
than do things that require little thought” and “I prefer complex problems to simple
problems.” The FI subscale includes five items such as “I believe in trusting my hunches”
and “I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I
know.” Higher scores for either subscale indicate an increased level of self-perceived
dispositional use of, and identification with, the identified cognitive processing capacity.
The original 34-item NFC was developed using a nonclinical sample of 419
undergraduate college students and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha value of .87. A follow-up
study using a sample of 527 undergraduate college students (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kao,
1984) indicated that NFC scale reliability attained an asymptote with the 18 highest
factor loading items, resulting in a new short-form version that correlated with the
original scale (r = .95, p < .001) and had a higher Cronbach’s alpha value of .90. The five
highest factor loading items of the NFC-SF were included in the REI-SF (Epstein et al.,
1996), which correlated strongly with the original (r = .90, p < .001) and had a
Cronbach’s alpha value of .73. Using the Spearman-Brown prophesy formula, it is
suggested that the internal reliability would be .91 were the short form scales expanded to
include the same number of items used in the original NFC-SF (Epstein, 2014). The fiveitem version of the NFC-SF as adapted for use in the REI-SF was used for this study.
The FI was developed as a counterpart to the NFC, based on the tenets of dual
process theories, to ascertain whether measures of experiential-cognitive processing
might be inversely related to measures of rational-cognitive processing (Epstein, 2014).
The original 12-item FI was tested on a nonclinical sample of 184 undergraduate college
students and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .77 and inter-item correlations of .23 (Epstein
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et al., 1996). The five FI items designated as having the highest factor loading and itemtotal correlations were subsequently used in the REI-SF, with a strong correlation to the
original FI scale (r = .85, p < .001) and a Cronbach’s alpha value of .72 (Epstein et al.,
1996). The five-item version of the FI as adapted for the REI-SF was used in this study.
Subsequent reliability and validity research on the REI have largely confirmed the
original results; however, no follow-up studies have been conducted on the REI-SF.
Pacini and Epstein (1998) reported a Cronbach’s alpha values of .87 for the composite
REI in a study with 399 undergraduate college students. In more recent research,
Björklund and Bäckström (2008) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 for the composite
REI, found support for its factor structure using both confirmatory and exploratory factor
analysis, and reported discriminant and concurrent validity based on correlations with
other measures. Another more recent study provided evidence for the divergent and
convergent validity of the REI, and also reported Cronbach’s alphas for the NFC and FI
scales of .88 and .86, respectively (Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & Godoy, 2009).
Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised
Skowron & Schmitt’s (2003) Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R)
was designed as a multidimensional approach to gauging individual differences in four
areas of interpersonal attachment. In modifying Bowen’s original formulation to include
these more distinctive and well-defined sub-dimensions, The DSI-R delineates two
interpsychic (fusion with others and emotional cutoff) from two intrapsychic (I-position
and emotional reactivity) functions of attachment experience. For the orientation
measure, only the intrapsychic variable of emotional reactivity (ER) and the interpsychic
variable of emotional cutoff (EC) function are utilized. The DSI measures includes an
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original 43-item long form (Skowron & Friedlander, 1998), the revised 46-item long
form (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), and a nine-item short form (Drake, Murdock,
Marszalek, & Barber, 2015).
The DSI-SF was used for this study and includes nine items on a five-point Likert
scale ranging from not very true of me to very true of me (Drake et al.,, 2015). The EC
subscale includes three items such as “I tend to distance myself when people get too close
to me” and “When one of my relationships becomes very intense, I feel the urge to run
away from it.” The ER subscale includes six items such as “At times my feelings get the
best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly” and “If someone is upset with me, I can’t
seem to let it go easily.” Higher scores for the subscales indicate an increased level of
self-perceived dispositional use of, and identification with, either an avoidant (EC) or
anxious (ER) attachment style.
The 46-item DSI-R was developed using a snowball sampling method that
included the use of social media and family-oriented internet websites to accrue 225 adult
participants and yield a Cronbach’s alpha values of .92 for the composite scale, .84 for
the EC subscale, and .89 for the ER subscale (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). Reliability and
validity research on the DSI-R has demonstrated good internal reliability, with one study
reporting a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 for the composite scale (Knauth & Skowron, 2004),
and another reporting Cronbach’s alphas of .89 for the composite DSI-R, .82 for the EC
subscale, and .88 for the ER subscale (Jankowski & Hooper, 2012). The latter study also
reported convergent and discriminant validity for the DSI-R based on correlations with
other measures of similar theoretical relevance (Jankoswski & Hooper).
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In developing the DSI-SF (Drake et al.,, 2015) a Graded Response Model (GRM)
was used to determine appropriate item parameters for each of the subscales, and a good
fit was reported for three of the EC subscale items (G2[46] = 164.32, p < 0.01) and six of
the ER subscale items (G2[136] = 131.27, p = .30). The scale was assessed using 595
undergraduate college student and revealed a Cronbach’s alpha value of .79 for the threeitem EC subscale and .80 for the six-item ER subscale. Additionally, the convergent
validity and test-retest reliability of the DSI-SF were reported. The nine-item DSI-SF was
used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies towards attachment avoidance and
attachment anxiety.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Davis’ (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) was designed as a
multidimensional approach to gauging individual differences in four different forms of
empathy: perspective-taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy
transposition. For the purposes of the orientation model only two of the four are used
since the sub-measures of perspective-taking (IRI-C) and empathic concern (IRI-E) are
respectively taken to represent cognitive and affective dual-processing experiences of
empathy. The cognitive perspective-taking subscale represents an ability to mentally take
the viewpoint of other people while the emotional empathic concern subscale signifies
feelings of concern for other people (Davis, 1980). The IRI-C and IRI-E subscales were
therefore used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies in the use of cognitive
empathy and emotional empathy.
The IRI consists of 28 items measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from
does not describe me very well to described me very well. The IRI-C subscale includes
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seven items such as “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how
things look from their perspective” and “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put
myself in their shoes’ for a while.” The IRI-E subscale consists of seven items such as “I
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and “I would
describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.” Higher scores for either subscales
indicates an increased level of self-perceived dispositional use of, and identification with,
cognitively-oriented empathic dual processing or affectively-oriented empathic dualprocessing.
The 28-item IRI was developed using a nonclinical sample of 158 undergraduate
college students and yielded Cronbach’s alphas of .78 for the composite instrument, .79
for the IRI-C subscale, and .80 for the IRI-E subscale (Davis, 1980). Numerous reliability
and validity studies on the IRI have been conducted with similar results. Applied to a
sample of 432 undergraduate students in Chile, researchers reported a Cronbach’s alpha
of .73 for both the IRI-C and IRI-E subscale, as well as evidence for test-retest reliability,
structural validity, and predictive validity of the composite IRI (Fernandez, Dufey, &
Kramp, 2011). In cross-cultural research sampling from 641 Dutch adults, De Corte et al.
(2007) reported Cronbach’s alphas of .73 for the IRI-C subscale and .73 for the IRI-E
subscale, as well as evidence for construct validity, convergent validity, and discriminant
validity. A French study using a nonclinical sample of 322 adults reported Cronbach’s
alphas of .71 for the IRI-C subscale, .70 for the IRI-E subscale, and good test-retest
reliability over a twelve month period (Gilet, Mella, Studer, Grühn, & Labouvie-Vief,
2013).
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Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire
The Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999)
was designed to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive dimensions of selffocused attention. It also served to explain how the self-absorption paradox (i.e.,
heightened self-focus results in both enhanced self-knowledge and psychological
maladjustment) arising from results in the private self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) is attributable to the measurement of two distinct cognitive
variables: reflection and rumination. The RRQ assesses for individual differences in these
self-focused attention styles, whereby reflection signifies an introspective tendency that is
motivated by intellectual curiosity while rumination is repetitive or chronic and
motivated by “perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self” (Trapnell & Campbell,
1999, p. 297). The reflection and rumination subscales of the 14-item RRQ short form
was used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies towards cognitive introspection
and emotional introspection.
The RRQ includes a 24-item version as well as a 14-item short-form, and both are
measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
The short-form reflection subscale consists of seven items such as “It is easy for me to
put unwanted thoughts out of my mind” and “I love to meditate on the nature and
meaning of things.” The short-form rumination subscale includes seven items such as “I
often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with” and
“Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself.” Higher scores for either
subscale indicate an increased level of self-perceived dispositional use of, and
identification with, cognitive or emotional introspective tendencies.
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The 24-item RRQ was developed across three studies using a combined
nonclinical sample of 1,137 undergraduate college students, and reported Cronbach’s
alphas of .91 for the reflection subscale and .90 for the rumination subscale. Despite the
relatively frequent use of the RRQ in empirical studies, few reliability and validity
studies have been conducted. Uttl, Morin, and Hamper (2011) reported a Cronbach’s
alpha of .89 for the reflection subscale and .87 for the rumination subscale in a sample of
380 undergraduate college students. For the development of a Japanese-version of the
RRQ, internal consistency and concurrent validity were evidenced among a sample of
241 undergraduate students, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 for the reflection subscale
and .88 for the rumination subscale (Takano & Tanno, 2009).
Procedures
Exempt status by the university’s institutional review board (IRB) was approved
for this study (Appendix I). Upon receiving IRB approval, participants were recruited
from 19 sections of a first-year seminar course (N = 452). Access to this population was
granted by the first-year seminar program director, who agreed to allow the survey to be
uploaded onto all UNC-registered student Blackboard accounts
(http://unco.blackboard.com) for the course using a designated, master webpage
controlled by the program director. All students who participated in the first-year seminar
utilized a course-specific Blackboard webpage, and the designated survey web-link was
posted on that webpage for all first-year seminar students to access. The researcher
posted a formal message (Appendix G) on the “Announcement” page of all first-year
seminar students about the opportunity to complete the survey.
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The researcher also sent this formal message out as a bulk email invitation to firstyear seminar students using the master webpage bulk email database, with permission for
access provided by the program director. Individual student information was protected in
this process, as a single email was automatically sent to all potential participants in the
first-year seminar course using a bulk emailing procedures. One follow-up bulk email
invitations (Appendix H) was distributed eight days later to remind potential participants
of the survey opportunity, during which time the survey remained openly accessible on
the first-year seminar course Blackboard page. Although data on the total number of
individual that accessed the survey was tallied by the Qualtrics survey software program,
no identifying information for non-participants was accessible to either the researcher or
the program director.
All participants were informed of the purpose of the study and that participation
would be entirely voluntary. The measures (Appendices B, C, D, E) and the basic
demographics questionnaire (Appendix F) were administered using a universityregistered Qualtrics account (http://unco.qualtrics.com) established by the researcher. The
informed consent to participate in research (Appendix A) was included on the first page
of the online survey (Qualtrics – http://unco.qualtrics.com). The informed consent let
participants know that choosing to continue in the survey by clicking “Start” implied both
consent and that they attested to the fact that they were 18 years of age or older.
Information about the random drawing for two $50.00 Amazon.com gift cards
was provided on the second page of the online survey. Participants were required to
complete all survey items in order to enter the prize drawing pool. Participants were also
required to provide their first-year seminar course section number and the last four digits
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of their university-registered Personal Digital Identity (PDID). All course section
numbers were provided in a drop-down list and a numerical text box was provided for
PDID four-digit numerical entries. The following statement was included on the second
page of the survey to clarify participant entry requirements:
If you wish to enter the random prize drawing to win one of two possible $50.00
Amazon.com gift cards, additional personal information is required so that a
winner can be contacted. Please select your first-year seminar course section
number and enter the last four digits of your official university PDID. If you do
not want to participate in the prize drawing, please click on the box below labeled
“No, I do not wish to participate in the random prize drawing”. All questions in
this survey must be completed in order to enter the random prize drawing. Thank
you for your participation.
The next five pages of the online survey included the researcher-developed demographics
questionnaire and four instruments. The demographics questionnaire included entries for
age, gender, and race/ethnicity (Appendix F). The four instruments included the RationalExperiential Inventory (REI; 10 Likert-type items), the Differentiation of Self InventoryRevised (DSI-R; 9 Likert-type items), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, 14 Likerttype items), and the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ; 14 Likert-type items).
The researcher maintains that this study presented no additional risks beyond
those typically associated with traditional surveys administered in academic and
university settings. Study analyses did not investigate individual survey responses, but
rather analyzed the data in aggregate. Participant names were not be used in any stage of
the data collection process. Student PDID and course section number information
provided to enter the random prize drawing were separated from all other data in a
designated Excel spreadsheet to ensure participant confidentiality. Numeric identifiers
were then randomly assigned to each completed survey following data collection in order
to maintain both organization in the data entry process and participant confidentiality in
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the data analysis process. Additional procedures were instituted to ensure that student
data were kept confidential and secure. The online Qualtrics account in which survey
responses were collected was both encrypted and password-protected. Survey data were
entered into a password-protected computer file and securely stored on a university
computer in the researcher’s locked office on campus. This data file was also saved in an
encrypted drive that was only accessible to the researcher.
Data Analysis
Following data collection, surveys were scored using the appropriate procedures
for each instrument. All demographic information and instrument data were organized
using an Excel spreadsheet and subsequently entered into SPSS version 22 for statistical
analysis. The data were then analyzed for descriptive statistics such as means, standard
deviations, and skewness for the four composite instruments as well as the eight
subscales. Internal consistency estimates were calculated for each composite to assess
reliability. The data were also assessed for violations of multivariate analysis assumptions
and for missing values.
To address the first research question, bivariate correlation analyses were
conducted to determine the degree and direction of relationships among subscales within
each of the four composite instruments. To address the second research question, a
canonical correlation analysis was conducted to determine the direction and magnitude of
relationships between the predictor variables and the outcome variables. Since the second
research question addressed the strength or degree of association between analytic and
experiential constructs as latent variables within the model, a canonical correlation
analysis was preferred over the use of a regression analysis of independent variables. By
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comparing weighted sums of the two variable sets, the hypothesized linear combination
of analytic and experiential subscales could be established as a correlation between the
sets. Standardized canonical function coefficients, structure coefficients, squared
structure coefficients, and redundancy estimates were analyzed to assess the variance of
the original variables, and the results were reviewed for violations of normality, linearity,
and homoscedasticity.
To address the remaining three research questions a factorial MANOVA was
conducted. Participants were grouped into high, medium, and low categories based on
percentile scores derived from the Need for Cognition (NC) and Faith in Intuition (FI)
subscales of the REI. In order to maintain relatively equivalent group sizes and remain
within the parameters of statistical test assumptions, about 33% of the participants were
assigned to each respective category. A 3 (NC-REI) x 3 (FI-REI) factorial MANOVA was
subsequently conducted on DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ composite scores. Finally, univariate
post hoc Tukey tests were conducted to determine how the NC categories and the FI
categories uniquely influence each of the six outcome variables across composite
instrument scores.
Summary
A non-experimental survey design was used in this study to examine whether the
four psychological constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and
introspection could be conceptually unified to develop a humanistic-existential
counseling assessment for use in case conceptualization and treatment planning. Five
hypotheses, guided by the tenets of dual process theory, were used to guide relevant
determinations of the direction and magnitude of relationships among the instrument
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variables. Data were collected from a sample of undergraduate college students using an
online survey comprised of a researcher developed demographics questionnaire, a short
form of the REI (Epstein et al., 1996), a short-form of the DSI-R (Drake et al.,, 2015;
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the IRI (Davis, 1980), and a short-form of the RRQ (Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999).
Data were analyzed in aggregate to address the guiding research questions and
evaluate the hypotheses. Preliminary analyses included descriptive statistics for each of
the variables as well as means, standard deviations, frequencies, skewness, and internal
consistency reliability estimates. Hypothesis H1 was analyzed using bivariate correlation
analyses. Hypothesis H2 was analyzed using canonical correlation analysis. Hypotheses
H3, H4, and H5 were analyzed using a 3 x 3 factorial MANOVA, as well as post-hoc
Tukey tests. In Chapter IV, the results of these analyses are described.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative analyses for this study. The
first section provides information on participant demographics as well as descriptive
statistics, multivariate normality, homogeneity of variances, and internal consistency
estimates for the instruments. The second section presents results for the following five
research questions. The final section provides a brief review of implications for the
results of the study. The level of significance for all statistical analyses was α = 0.05.
Q1

Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)?

Q2

Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI,
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ?

Q3

How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale
of the REI?

Q4

How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores)
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the
REI?
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Q5

How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition
subscale of the REI?

Preliminary Analyses
Demographic Data
The sample consisted of 375 college freshmen from a medium-sized, Midwestern
four-year research university in the United States. The survey response rate was 83%. All
participants completed a researcher developed demographics questionnaire disclosing
age, gender, and race/ethnicity (see Table 2). All participants reported being either 18 or
19 years of age. Participants that reported being under the age of 18 were automatically
barred from completing the survey. Of the 375 participants, 251 reported being female
(66.9%) and 124 reported being male (33.1%). This is comparable to the student gender
distribution for the entire university – 63.5% female and 36.5% male – as of the fall of
2015. Most participants were Caucasian (n = 257; 68.5%), while others reported being
Hispanic (n = 83; 22.1%), African American (n = 20; 5.3%), Asian (n = 5; 1.3%), Native
American or Alaskan (n = 1; 0.3%), and several participants reported as other (n = 9;
2.4%) but did not specify their racial/ethnic identity.
Multivariate Normality
Prior to hypothesis testing, the data were assessed for outliers and normality
distributions among the scores. Multivariate normality was assessed through a close
examination of the univariate distributions due to the inherent complexities involved in
assessing multivariate normality distributions (Kline, 2005). Using stem-and-leaf plots,
seventeen outliers were discovered across the eight subscales and these values were
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subsequently transformed using the Winsorizing method – or by substituting the actual
value for the closest normative value – as recommended by Ghosh and Vogt (2012). This
included five outlier scores of 1.0 for the REI-FI adjusted to the next lowest score of 1.6,
three outlier scores of 5.0 for the DSI-EC adjusted to the next highest score of 4.5, three
outlier scores of 4.6 for the DSI-ER adjusted to the next highest score of 4.2, one outlier
score of 5.0 for the RRQ-Rf adjusted to the next highest score of 4.7, and five outlier
scores of 1.3 for the RRQ-Rm adjusted to the next lowest score of 1.6.

Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sample

Age Group

N
375

%
100

0

0

Male

124

33.1

Female

251

66.9

Caucasian

257

68.5

Hispanic/Latino

83

22.1

African American

20

5.3

Asian

5

1.3

Native American/Alaskan

1

0.3

Other

9

2.4

18-19
20+

Gender

Race/Ethnicity

Note. N = 375.
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Subsequently analyzed histograms and box plots indicated that each of the
variables were distributed normally around the mean. The values for both skewness and
kurtosis were within an acceptable range for all subscales (Kline, 2005; West, Finch, &
Curran, 1995), thus further supporting the graphical evidence for a normal distribution of
scores (see Table 3). The absolute value of skewness for the DSI-EC proved to be highest
among the subscales at 1.838, yet remained less than the absolute value of 2.0 as a
moderate-level criterion (West et al., 1995). The absolute value of kurtosis for the REINC proved to be the highest among the subscales at 1.648, yet remained less than the
absolute value of 2.0 as a moderate-level criterion for normally distributed data (Garson,
2012; Kline, 2005).

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Orientation Model
REI-NC

REI-FI

DSI-EC

DSI-ER

IRI-C

IRI-E

RRQ-Rf

RRQ-Rm

Mean

3.47

3.63

2.75

3.31

3.61

3.76

3.29

3.32

SD

.53

.50

.88

.77

.51

.54

.70

.66

Minimum

2.0

2.2

1.33

1.33

1.86

2.14

1.33

1.33

Maximum

4.8

4.8

4.66

4.83

4.86

4.86

4.83

4.88

Range

2.6

2.6

3.33

3.5

3.0

2.72

3.5

3.55

Skewness

-.017

-.036

.239

-.160

.003

.158

.150

-.027

Kurtosis

-.412

.348

-.230

-.322

.400

-.311

.059

-.078

Note. N = 375. Standard error for skewness was .13 and standard error for kurtosis was
.25 for all scales.

88

Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices
Despite equal sample sizes, Box’s M was assessed to establish equality of
covariances and was found to be insignificant for all three MANOVAs and the canonical
correlation analysis (CCA). This step was performed to ensure that the within-group
covariance matrices were equal in accordance with the statistical assumptions required
for both multivariate analyses of variance and canonical correlation analyses. Univariate
homogeneity of variance was also tested for each dependent variable using Levene’s test,
which established the equality of error variances for all three MANOVAs.
For research question three, error variance was F(8, 366) = 1.760, p = .084 for the
Emotional Cutoff subscale and F(8, 366) = .780, p = .620 for the Emotional Reactivity
subscale. For research question four, error variance was F(8, 366) = .681, p = .708 for the
Cognitive Empathy subscale and F(8, 366) = 1.745, p = .087 for the Emotional Empathy
subscale. For research question five, error variance was F(8, 366) = .981, p = .450 for the
Reflection subscale and F(8, 366) = 2.289, p = .051 for the Rumination subscale. With an
equal number of participants in each group as well as Box’s M and Levene’s test proving
insignificant, the robustness of the MANOVAs and CCA was ensured.
Reliability of Instruments
Beyond the demographic questionnaire, participants completed four self-report
surveys to measure variables within the orientation model. These Likert-type surveys
included measures of cognitive processing style (Rational Experiential Inventory; Epstein
et al., 1996), attachment style (Differentiation of Self Inventory - Revised; Skowron &
Schmitt, 2003), empathy style (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983), and selffocused attention style (Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire; Trapnell & Campbell,
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1999). Internal consistency estimates of reliability were derived using Cronbach’s alpha
scores, wherein the subscales ranged from .67 to .83 (see Table 4).
While the Cronbach’s alpha of .67 for the REI-NC and the REI-FI subscales is
somewhat lower than that found in previous studies, it is certainly comparable (Epstein et
al., 1996) and a predictable consequence of test length (Schmitt, 1996). It has also been
argued that the Spearman-Brown prophesy formula indicates a much higher internal
reliability were the REI short-form expanded to the length of the REI long-form (Epstein
et al., 1996). Although any such argument does not automatically offset the potential
problem of reliability for the subscales, the face validity of the items do indicate a
reasonable degree of unidimensionality and content coverage within their respective
domains (Epstein, 2014; Schmitt, 1996).

Table 4
Reliability Information
Instrument
REI-Need for Cognition subscale

N
5

α
.674

REI-Faith in Intuition subscale

5

.672

DSI-Emotional Cutoff subscale

3

.779

DSI-Emotional Reactivity subscale

6

.812

IRI-Cognitive Empathy subscale

7

.726

IRI-Emotional Empathy subscale

7

.779

RRQ-Reflection subscale

6

.824

RRQ-Rumination subscale

8

.837
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As for the remaining six subscales, internal reliability estimates were well within
the acceptable range (i.e., above .70) for use in the social sciences (Knapp & Mueller,
2010) and were quite similar to results established across previous studies. As such, the
current study lends additional empirical support to the established internal reliability
estimates for the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised-Short Form (Drake et al.,,
2015), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index subscales (Davis, 1983), and the ReflectionRumination Questionnaire subscales (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Research Question One
Q1

Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)?

H1a

No significant relationship will exist for cognitive orientation subscales.

H1b

A significant positive relationship will exist for attachment orientation
subscales.

H1c

A significant positive relationship will exist for empathic orientation
subscales.

H1d

No significant relationship will exist for introspective orientation
subscales.

It was hypothesized that significant positive relationships would exist between
paired constructs for the attachment orientation and the empathic orientation, while no
significant relationships would exist between paired constructs for the cognitive
orientation and introspective orientation. The results supported these hypotheses. The
Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition subscales of the REI were not significantly
correlated (r = .047, p = .366), and neither were the reflection and rumination subscales
of the RRQ (r = .058, p = .266). The emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity subscales
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of the DSI-R were significantly positively correlated (r = .328, p < 0.01), as were the
cognitive and emotional empathy subscales (r = .451, p < 0.01). A correlation matrix of
the eight variables was analyzed and the resulting Pearson product-moment correlations
are found in Table 5.
Additionally, the lack of a statistically significant correlation between the Need
for Cognition and Faith in Intuition subscales effectively resolved potential concerns as to
the assumption of multicollinearity in the canonical correlation analysis for research
question two.

Table 5
Correlation Matrix for the Orientation Model Variables
REI-NC
REI-NC
REI-FI
DSI-EC
DSI-ER
IRI-C
IRI-E
RRQ-Rf
RRQ-

1

REI-FI

DSI-EC

DSI-ER

IRI-C

.05

-.15**

-.15**

.31**

1

-.10*

-.11*

1

IRI-E

RRQ-Rf

RRQ-Rm

.15**

.32**

-.15**

.01

.01

.02

-.07

.33**

-.09

-.08

-.08

.34**

1

.10*

.32**

.05

.62**

1

.45**

.39**

-.09

1

.33**

.21**

1

.06
1

Rm

Note. N = 375. * indicates correlation is significant at p < 0.05 level. ** indicates
correlation is significant at p < 0.01 level. Bivariate correlations assessed for research
question 1 are bolded.
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Research Question Two
Q2

Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI,
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ?

H2a

Positive relationships will exist across the four analytic process subscales.

H2b

Positive relationships will exist across the four experiential process
subscales.

A canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was conducted to determine the
relationships among the hypothesized analytic and experiential variable sets. The CCA
revealed three statistically significant functions with squared canonical correlations of
.289, .162, and .030 (R2). The Wilk’s lambda for the complete model was statistically
significant at .577, F(16, 1121.84) = 13.79, p < .001, thereby making the R2 type effect
size approximately .42 for the full model. As such, 42% of the shared variance between
the two sets of variables is explained by the model.
Function 2 to 4 was statistically significant at .81, F(9, 895.77) = 8.85, p < .001,
explaining about 16% of the shared variance. Function 3 to 4 was also significant at .97,
F(4, 738) = 2.82, p = .024, explaining about 3% of the shared variance. Function 4 to 4
was statistically insignificant. Considering the R2 for each successive function, only the
first and second functions were regarded as important indicators of underlying synthetic
variables in the study. Standardized canonical function coefficients, structure coefficients,
and squared structure coefficients for Function 1 and Function 2 are found in Table 6.
As hypothesized, the structure coefficients for each of the predictor variables were
significantly related to Function 1, along with the unspecified inclusion of emotional
empathy (r = -.802). The structure coefficients for all variables were negative aside from
emotional cutoff. This aligns conceptually with the negative implications of high
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attachment avoidance scores insofar as the orientation model predicts that high
participant scores on need for cognition, cognitive empathy, and reflection should
directly correspond with low attachment avoidance scores. The structure coefficients for
three of the four criterion variables were significantly related to Function 2, along with
the unspecified inclusion of emotional cutoff (r = -.748). Faith in Intuition was not
significantly related to any canonical functions in the model. Within Function 2, the
structure coefficients were negative for all hypothesized experiential variables.

Table 6
Canonical Solutions for Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Variable Sets
Function 1

Function 2

Variable

Coef

r

r2 (%)

Coef

r

r2 (%)

REI-NC

-.100

-.455

19.80

.415

.264

6.97

REI-FI

-.031

-.108

1.17

.132

.217

4.71

DSI-EC

.451

.545

29.70

-.759

-.748

55.95

DSI-ER

.110

.149

2.22

-.679

-.938

87.98

IRI-C

-.719

-.860

73.96

-.490

-.424

17.98

IRI-E

-.948

-.802

64.32

-.273

-.537

28.84

RRQ-Rf

-.175

-.521

27.14

-.339

-.338

11.42

RRQ-Rm

.537

.409

16.73

-.253

-.743

55.21

Note. Structure coefficients (r) greater than |.45| are bolded. Coef = standardized
canonical function coefficient; r = structure coefficient; r2 = squared structure coefficient.
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The redundancy analysis within CCA indicates the strength of canonical cross
loadings between the predictor and criterion variables. As seen in Table 7, the only
variable with a statistically significant adequacy coefficient in the redundancy analysis
was cognitive empathy. This stems from the relative degree of multicollinearity between
cognitive and emotional empathy variables in conjunction with the significant
relationship of emotional empathy to both canonical variates seen in Table 5. Otherwise,
the redundancy analysis lends further support to the hypothesis that there is a unique
relationship among analytic processes and among experiential processes within the
orientation model.
The CCA lends some clearly interpretable support to the hypothesis that the four
analytic process subscales are uniquely related, thereby resulting in Hypothesis 2a being
accepted. The results for the experiential process subscales are not so clear. The exclusion
of the faith in intuition variable from any significant findings indicates that this measure
is not significantly related to either the hypothesized analytic or the hypothesized
experiential variable sets. As such, Hypothesis 2b was rejected. However, there is a
notably significant relationship among the other hypothesized experiential variables
which, combined with the lack of significant cross loadings, indicates that there is indeed
an overarching conceptual distinction to be drawn between the analytic and experiential
variable sets despite the statistical insignificance of the Faith in Intuition subscale within
the model.
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Table 7
Redundancy Analysis Results for Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Variable Sets
Predictor Variables Set

Criterion Variables Set

REI-NC

DSI-EC

IRI-C

RRQ-Rf

REI-FI

DSI-ER

IRI-E

RRQRm

V1

-.239

.293

-.462

-.280

-.058

.080

-.431

.220

V2

.106

-.301

-.171

-.136

.087

-.378

-.216

-.299

Note. V1 = Variate 1; V2 = Variate 2; adequacy coefficients greater than |.45| are bolded.

Research Question Three
Q3

How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale
of the REI?

H3a

For attachment avoidance scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

H3b

For attachment anxiety in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean will be
larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, which
will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict
variations in the estimated marginal means for attachment anxiety and attachment
avoidance scores on the DSI-R, respectively. A significant difference was not found
between need for cognition and attachment patterns (Wilk’s λ = .980, F(4, 730) = 1.859,
p < .116), nor between faith in intuition and attachment patterns (Wilk’s λ = .982,
F(4,730) = 1.625, p < .166).
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However, as seen in Table 8, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that
need for cognition predicts attachment avoidance (F = 3.072, p < .048) but not
attachment anxiety (F = 1.088, p = .159), while faith in intuition predicted neither
attachment avoidance (F = .929, p = .396) nor attachment anxiety (F = 2.875, p = .058).
A post hoc one-way Tukey test revealed that both low (p = .019) and high (p < .001)
scores were significantly different on the Need for Cognition subscale in regard to the
variable of emotional cutoff. Since the relationship between the Faith in Intuition
subscale and attachment anxiety was not statistically significant, Hypothesis H3b was
rejected.

Table 8
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and
Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised Subscales
Source

Dependent
Variable

Type III SS

Df

F

p

REI-NC

DSI-EC

4.919

2

3.072

.048

DSI-ER

2.175

2

1.851

.159

DSI-EC

1.421

2

.929

.396

DSI-ER

3.385

2

2.875

.058

REI-FI

Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded.
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Table 9
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised
Dependent
Variable
DSI-EC

DSI-ER

Need for
Cognition

M

SE

.079

95% CI
Lower
Bound
2.729

95% CI
Upper
Bound
3.040

Low

2.884

Medium

2.715

.079

2.559

2.870

High

2.614

.081

2.455

2.773

Low

3.398

.069

3.261

3.534

Medium

3.326

.069

3.189

3.462

High

3.214

.071

3.074

3.353

Note. N = 125; DSI-EC = Emotional Cutoff subscale; DSI-ER = Emotional Reactivity
subscale.

The estimated marginal means (see Table 9) of the need for cognition subscale in
relation to attachment avoidance scores indicated that means for the high scoring group
were smaller than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had smaller means that
the low scoring group (high: 2.614, medium: 2.715, low: 2.884), indicating that higher
need for cognition scores correspond with lower attachment avoidance scores. Although
categorical levels of intensity on the Need for Cognition subscale impacted self-reported
cognitive empathy, the actual direction of influence was inverse to the predicted direction
and therefore Hypothesis H3a was rejected.
Research Question Four
Q4

How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores)
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the
REI?
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H4a

For cognitive empathy scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the mean
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores,
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

H4b

For emotional empathy scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores,
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict
variations in the estimated marginal means for cognitive empathy and emotional empathy
scores on the IRI. A significant difference was found between need for cognition and
empathy patterns (Wilk’s λ = .926, F(4, 730) = 7.111, p < .001), but not between faith in
intuition and empathy (Wilk’s λ = .998, F(4, 730) = .139, p < .968).
As seen in table 10, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that need for
cognition significantly predicts both cognitive empathy (F = 14.454, p < .001) and
emotional empathy (F = 3.488, p < .032), but faith in intuition is predictive of neither
cognitive (F = .067, p = .935) nor emotional (F = .145, p = .865) empathy. A post hoc
one-way Tukey test revealed that both low (p < .001) and medium (p < .001) scores were
significantly different on the Need for Cognition subscale in relation to cognitive
empathy. Additionally, low and high scores (p = .014) were significantly different on the
Need for Cognition subscale for the measure of emotional empathy. Insofar as the
relationship between the Faith in Intuition subscale and emotional empathy was not
statistically significant, Hypothesis H4b was rejected.
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Table 10
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Subscales
Source

Dependent
Variable

Type III SS

Df

F

p

REI-NC

IRI-C

6.864

2

14.454

.001

IRI-E

2.007

2

3.488

.032

IRI-C

.032

2

.067

.935

IRI-E

.083

2

.145

.865

REI-FI

Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded.

The estimated marginal means (see Table 11) of the need for cognition subscale
in relation to cognitive empathy scores indicated that means for the high scoring group
were larger than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had larger means that the
low scoring group (high: 3.793, medium: 3.583, low: 3.458). The same patterns was
found for the Need for Cognition subscale relative to emotional empathy scores (high:
3.858, medium: 3.735, low: 3.679), indicating that higher need for cognition scores also
correspond with higher emotional empathy scores. Since categorical levels of intensity on
the need for cognition subscale influenced self-reported cognitive empathy, Hypothesis
H4a was accepted.
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Table 11
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Interpersonal Reactivity Index Subscales
Dependent
Variable
IRI-C

IRI-E

Need for
Cognition

M

SE

.044

95% CI
Lower
Bound
3.371

95% CI
Upper
Bound
3.544

Low

3.458

Medium

3.583

.044

3.496

3.669

High

3.793

.045

3.704

3.881

Low

3.679

.048

3.583

3.774

Medium

3.735

.049

3.639

3.830

High

3.858

.049

3.761

3.955

Note. N = 125; IRI-C = Cognitive Empathy subscale; IRI-E = Emotional Empathy
subscale.

Research Question Five
Q5

How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition
subscale of the REI?

H5a

For reflective introspection scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

H5b

For ruminative introspection scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.

A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict
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variations in the estimated marginal means for reflective introspection and ruminative
introspection scores on the RRQ. A significant difference was found between need for
cognition and introspective patterns (Wilk’s λ = .895, F(4, 730) = 10.446, p < .001), but
not between faith in intuition and introspective patterns (Wilk’s λ = .990, F(4, 730) =
.905, p = .460).

Table 12
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and
Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire Subscales
Source

REI-NC

REI-FI

Dependent
Variable

Type III SS

Df

F

p

RRQ-Reflection

15.037

2

16.582

.001

RRQ-Rumination

2.835

2

3.319

.037

RRQ-Reflection

1.009

2

1.113

.330

RRQ-Rumination

.693

2

.811

.445

Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded.

As seen in Table 12, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that need for
cognition predicts both reflection (F = 16.582, p < .001) and rumination (F = 3.319, p <
.037), but faith in intuition is predictive of neither reflection (F = 1.113, p = .330) nor
rumination (F = .811, p = .445) empathy. A post hoc one-way Tukey test revealed that
both low (p < .001) and medium (p < .001) scores were significantly different on the
Need for Cognition subscale in regard to reflective introspection. Additionally, low and
high scores were significantly different (p = .021) on the Need for Cognition subscale for
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the measure of ruminative introspection. Since the relationship between the Faith in
Intuition subscale and rumination was not statistically significant, Hypothesis H5b was
rejected.

Table 13
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire Subscales
Dependent
Variable
RRQ-Rf

RRQ-Rm

Need for
Cognition

M

SE

.061

95% CI
Lower
Bound
2.957

95% CI
Upper
Bound
3.197

Low

3.077

Medium

3.217

.061

3.097

3.337

High

3.564

.062

3.442

3.687

Low

3.402

.059

3.286

3.518

Medium

3.356

.059

3.239

3.472

High

3.194

.060

3.076

3.313

Note. N = 125; RRQ-Rf = Reflection subscale; RRQ-Rm = Rumination subscale.

The estimated marginal means (see Table 13) of the Need for Cognition subscale
in relation to introspective reflection scores indicated that means for the high scoring
group were larger than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had larger means
than the low scoring group (high: 3.564, medium: 3.217, low: 3.077). The inverse was
found among the need for cognition groups relative to introspective rumination scores
(high: 3.194, medium: 3.356, low: 3.402), indicating that higher need for cognition scores
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also correspond with lower rumination scores. Since categorical levels of intensity on the
Need for Cognition subscale influenced self-reported introspective reflection, Hypothesis
H5a was accepted.
Summary
In this chapter, the study results were reported along with preliminary analyses of
demographic data, descriptive statistics, and tests of relevant statistical assumptions. All
hypotheses were accepted for research question one. For research question two,
Hypothesis 2a was accepted while Hypothesis 2b was rejected. For research questions
three, four and five, Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 5a related to the Need for Cognition subscale
were accepted while Hypotheses 3b, 4b, and 5b related to the Faith in Intuition subscale
were rejected. Generally speaking, the results indicate that experiential cognition is
inadequately represented by the Faith in Intuition subscale. All related hypotheses were
thus rendered insignificant despite the apparent relationship of the other hypothesized
experiential variables to one another as well as one of the latent canonical variates.
However, analytic cognition appears to be significantly related to nearly all of the
orientation model variables while simultaneously representing a significant portion of the
shared variance for one of the latent canonical variates. This unexpected result creates a
series of important questions and potential interpretations of the current study that will be
subsequently reviewed. An overview and interpretation of current study results is
provided in the next chapter, along with a review of implications for clinical practice,
limitations of the study, and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This chapter provides a summary and discussion of the data analyses as well as
the implications and limitations of this study. The first section summarizes the
quantitative results of the study in light of the theoretical framework of the orientation
model and the broader literature on dual process theories. The second section considers
clinical and educational implications for the use of the orientation model in mental health
settings, supervision practices, and academic research. The final sections explore the
limitations of this study and considers future directions for research.
Summary of the Study
The purpose of this study was to validate the structure of the proposed orientation
model by exploring the relationships among its variables. Modeled within a dual process
framework, it was hypothesized that the two subscales among each of four distinct
composite instruments can be used to distinguish between analytic and experiential
cognitive processing tendencies. The primary constructs include measures of rational and
intuitive cognition styles, emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity attachment styles,
cognitive and emotional empathy styles, and reflective and ruminative introspection
styles. Accordingly, the orientation model proposes that dispositional tendencies towards
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rational cognition, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective introspection are
interrelated by means of analytic dual-processing, whereas such dispositional tendencies
towards intuitive cognition, emotional reactivity, emotional empathy, and ruminative
introspection are interrelated by means of experiential dual-processing (Wilkinson,
2015).
While dispositional cognitive tendencies are a hallmark of the literature on dualprocessing, three of the four constructs and corresponding measures used in the
orientation model were not developed with dual process theories in mind. These
instruments included the Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron &
Schmitt, 2003), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the ReflectionRumination Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The current study thus
sought to investigate whether these dispositional measures of attachment, empathy and
introspection might inadvertently gauge dual-processing tendencies. It was therefore
surmised that the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) - explicitly
designed using a dual-processing framework - would effectively serve as a conceptual
point of reference by which to ascertain the validity of the overarching hypothesis driving
the orientation model.
The sample consisted of 375 undergraduate freshmen at a medium-sized,
Midwestern research university. All participants were administered the researcher
developed demographics questionnaire as well as the four composite instruments used
with the orientation model. Bivariate correlations of the sub-measures within each of the
four composite instruments replicated the well-established findings for each instrument
and thus lend further support to the existing literature on each measure. Assumptions for
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all subsequent analyses in the study were tested, including multivariate normality and the
homogeneity of covariance matrices. The results of the subsequent canonical correlation
analysis and factorial MANOVAs are discussed in detail below.
Latent Variables Underlying the
Orientation Model
A canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was conducted to determine whether the
hypothesized relationships among the analytic and experiential variable sets were valid.
Overall, two significant canonical functions were derived from the analysis wherein
significant structure coefficients for each set of variables generally aligned with the
hypothesized distinction between analytic and experiential dual-processing tendencies.
Analytic cognition, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective introspection
were all significantly related to Function 1, albeit with the inclusion of emotional
empathy. However, emotional empathy was also significantly related to Function 2 along
with emotional reactivity and ruminative introspection, as well as the variable of
emotional cutoff. The direction of these significant relationships lends support to the
overarching hypothesis that the variables are generally distinguishable as analytic and
experiential dual-processing sets that align with Function 1 and Function 2, respectively.
The degree to which cognitive and emotional empathy both influence the shared
variance of analytic cognition while emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity both
influence experiential cognition is a consequence of the positive correlations found
among the subscales. However, it also poses a conceptual dilemma as to whether the
canonical functions are actually indicative of analytic and experiential tendencies. An
alternative interpretation might be that Function 1 represents positive self-regard related
to adaptability and perceptiveness while Function 2 represents self-perceived emotional
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vulnerability and sensitivity. This would also account for the significant cross loadings
found among both the empathy and the attachment variables. Such an interpretation
remains aligned with the thinking/feeling dichotomy as proposed by the orientation
model (Wilkinson, 2015), albeit distinct from the hypotheses set forth in this particular
study due to the positive and negative affective valences thus attributed to each set of
variables.
The lack of significance of the experiential cognition variable does pose a distinct
concern for the orientation model. Considered in the context of the alternative
interpretation of the canonical functions as noted above, it seems likely that the Faith in
Intuition subscale used to measure experiential cognitions is unrelated to either emotional
vulnerability or sensitivity. Rather, it appears to more closely relate to constructs such as
latent self-awareness and unconscious insight, which actually corresponds with an
interpretation presented by Epstein (2014) regarding the psychoanalytic notions that
influenced the scale’s original development. By framing analytic and experiential
tendencies in terms of conscious and unconscious awareness rather than the distinction
between controlled and automatic cognitions used by most modern dual-process theorists,
the Faith in Intuition subscale appears to gauge a form of experiential processing distinct
from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity, and therefore unrelated to the hypothesized
experiential variables as implemented in the orientation model.
This interpretation sheds light on the insignificance of the Faith in Intuition
subscale in relation to all subsequent analyses conducted for this study. In addressing
research questions three, four, and five, the Faith in Intuition subscale proved to have no
significant differences. The fact that the primary scale used to measure the construct of
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experiential processing in this study did not significantly relate to any of the other
hypothesized experiential variables only serves to further substantiate the notion that it
may measure a distinct form of experiential processing related to unconscious insight.
However, the benefit derived from this interpretation is that the orientation model would
benefit from either the inclusion of an alternative assessment of intuitive cognition or the
development of a scale that utilizes automatic cognitive processing rather than a form of
unconscious insight as its foundational construct.
Categorical Levels of Intensity
for Analytic Cognition
Although the Faith in Intuition subscale provided no significant results across
analyses in this study, the need for cognition scale contributed more significantly to the
findings than was expected. The results of three separate factorial MANOVAs indicated
that the analytic cognition variable measured using the Need for Cognition subscale is a
significant predictor of not only emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective
introspection, but emotional empathy and ruminative introspection as well. Based on
percentile scores, participants were grouped into low, medium, and high scoring
conditions derived from their Need for Cognition subscale means, resulting in equal
sample sizes for all categories (n = 125). These categorical levels of analytic cognition
intensity were subsequently used to determine both the significance and direction of
participant mean scores for the dependent variables in each analysis. Across all
groupings, the categorical levels of analytic cognition intensity aligned with the direction
of dependent variables scores as hypothesized within the orientation model (Wilkinson,
2015).
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For attachment avoidance, an increase in categorical levels of analytic cognition
intensity corresponded with a lowering of mean scores on the emotional cutoff subscale.
This indicates that as the dispositional use of analytic cognition increases, the use of
emotional cutoff as a maladaptive coping mechanism tends to decrease. Such a result
aligns with the conceptual tenets of self-differentiation, which maintains that attachment
avoidance strategies such as emotional cutoff are used less often when healthy
interpersonal boundaries are more effectively implemented, cognitive flexibility is
enhanced, and affective resilience increases (Bowen, 1978; Skowron & Friedlander,
1998). Interestingly, analytic cognition similarly predicted the direction of mean scores
for emotional reactivity despite the lack of overall statistical significance between the two
variables.
For the measure of empathy, an increase in categorical levels of analytic cognition
intensity corresponded with an increase of mean scores for both the cognitive and
emotional empathy subscales. As further evidenced in the canonical correlation analysis,
both empathy variables were significantly related to analytic cognition while the direction
of the relationship was similarly associated. As such, increases in the dispositional use of
analytic cognition correspond with increases in both cognitive and emotional empathy.
The orientation model maintains that optimal mental health functioning should involve an
increase in both forms of empathy as well as analytic cognition (Wilkinson, 2015).
Furthermore, research has shown that the consistent use of both cognitive and emotional
empathy leads to increases in positive coping (Davis, 1996) and healthy interpersonal
functioning (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
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For the measure of introspection, an increase in categorical levels of analytic
cognition intensity corresponded with an increase of mean scores for the reflective
introspection subscale and a decrease of mean scores for the ruminative introspection
subscale. In other words, an increase in the dispositional use of analytic cognition is
associated with both an increase in reflective introspection and a decrease in ruminative
introspection. According to the orientation model, optimal mental health functioning
should result in just such a distinction (Wilkinson, 2015). Reflection is generally
associated with positive psychological outcomes related to intellectual curiosity (Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999) and cognitive adaptability (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010) The
habitual use of ruminative introspection, on the other hand, is related to maladaptive
psychological outcomes such as anxiety and depression (Watkins, 2008) as well as
affective immersion in negative emotions (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005).
Interpretation of the Orientation
Model Structure Based on
Results of the Study
These three sets of results lend further support to the alternative hypothesis that
was established above based on the CCA interpretation. Rather than view the proposed
analytic and experiential variables sets according to the dual-processing distinction
between automatic and controlled cognitive processing tendencies, there is room to
consider whether these variable sets are actually indicative of self-perceived adaptability
and vulnerability, respectively. As a descriptive tool for gauging mental health outcomes,
this interpretation may provide a richer foundation than a strictly dual process-based
account alone. The orientation model predicted the direction of subscale scores for both
optimal and sub-optimal mental health outcomes (Wilkinson, 2015). Insofar as the
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analytic cognition results for research questions three, four, and five in this study directly
correspond with the predictions set forth in the orientation model, the present study lends
additional credibility to the underlying premises that guide the model.
Researchers tend to weave positive mental health outcomes inextricably together
with concepts such as resiliency and adaptiveness as protective psychological factors
(Fredrickson, 2001; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). In kind, deficits in resiliency
and adaptiveness are often discussed in relation to maladaptive coping strategies and
emotional dysregulation (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), as well as being
considered in the context of emotional vulnerabilities and related psychopathologies
(Berking & Wupperman, 2012; Vaillant, 2000). If the orientation model indeed gauges
the degree to which participants perceive themselves as either maintaining or lacking in
psychological resiliency and adaptiveness, then its results provide a descriptive account
of mental health and well-being rather than an explanatory account of dual-processing
tendencies.
For the purposes of measuring progress in counseling and supervision, this has its
obvious benefits. Providing counselors and supervisors with a tool to assess the severity
of self-perceived emotional vulnerabilities in particular domains can enhance the
specificity of case conceptualizations and interventions designed to promote growth in
those areas. However, it runs counter to the prevailing idea among dual process theorists
that analytic and experiential dual-processing tendencies are conceptually independent of
value assessments (Evans, 2010). In other words, analytic and experiential cognitions
should not be considered in terms of either positive or negative mental health outcomes.
While a dispositional tendency towards the use of experiential cognitions may logically
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correspond with the use of affective-oriented coping strategies, such strategies are not
inherently flawed and their outcomes should not necessarily be deemed as maladaptive
simply due to their affective bent (Epstein, 2014).
At the same time, the face validity of experiential measures used within the
orientation model lean toward an emphasis on negative emotional consequences. Items
such as “I’m overly sensitive to criticism” on the emotional reactivity subscale, or
“Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself” on the ruminative
introspection subscale clearly demonstrate maladaptive mental health outcomes. This
disparity between the value independent premises of dual-processing and the positivenegative valences attributable to some of the experiential measures within the orientation
model raises a concern as to whether experiential processes can be quantified
independently of negative emotional consequences. It has been argued by some theorists
that experiential dual-processing tendencies are not measurable due to their being
automatic and uncontrolled (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011). The spontaneous and
reactive nature of such cognitions - looming outside of immediate awareness - may
preclude their quantification.
As an alternative, it could be that relatively low scores across the analytic
variables within the orientation model would provide a better indication of experiential
processing tendencies than a separate set of experiential scales. This would be a case of a
lack of analytic processing serving as an indicator for experiential processing as the only
logical alternative. In other words, if one does not display a tendency to rely upon
analytic cognitions under stressful conditions then their habitual tendency will likely be
towards more automatic and experiential methods of coping. The predictive capacity of
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the Need for Cognition subscale as evidenced in this study would suggest that it may
provide a more reliable basis for discriminating between analytic and experiential dualprocessing tendencies. Pragmatically speaking, it would serve the same function as an
experiential cognition subscale and reduce the total number of survey items in the
orientation model. Yet it should be noted that there is no current research evidence to
suggest that a deficit in analytic cognition necessarily reflects a surfeit in experiential
cognition, or vice versa (Epstein, 2014; Epstein et al., 1996).
Implications
The orientation model was primarily designed as an assessment tool to
supplement case conceptualization practices in clinical practice. Merging several notable
and empirically-validated instruments into a single measure of dual-processing
tendencies, the model provides counselors with a means to assess important dispositional
characteristics of clients early in the treatment process. This is particularly relevant for
practitioners who are philosophically opposed to the use of quantitative measures, as is
often the case among humanistic counselors. Dual processing capacities are clinically
atheoretical insofar as any dispositional tendency to utilize analytic or experiential
cognitions is unrelated to either positive or negative psychological outcomes. Such an
equivocation inappropriately reduces the complexity of dual-process systems into an
adaptive and maladaptive dichotomy.
However, the results of the current study might be interpreted as pointing to just
such an equivocation. In light of these findings it is important to address two conceptual
concerns related to such an interpretation of the orientation model. First, any proposed
thinking/feeling dichotomy is an oversimplification of the dual-processing framework.
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This point cannot be overstated and was clearly addressed by Wilkinson (2015) when
developing the model. While there is indeed an emotional element associated with
experiential tendencies, affect is not the de facto foundation for all such processing
capacities. Experiential processing remains a form of cognition that conceptually
subsumes affect as a distinct process therein. In so doing, affect is not reducible to mere
reactivity or maladaptive responsiveness. Instead it encapsulates a range of behavioral
control mechanisms including certain forms of emotional regulation and implicit learning
(Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014; Stanovich et al., 2014).
The purpose of the thinking/feeling dichotomy is to simplify the conceptual
framework such that a detailed knowledge of dual-process theories is not required to
interpret results derived from the orientation model. A problem arises, however, when
feeling is simply equated with a lack of inhibitory control or tendencies toward emotional
dysregulation. Dual-process theories explicitly highlight the vital role of both analytic
and experiential processing in emotional dysregulation. The capacity of analytic
processes to override experiential processes involves decoupling, or the ability to sustain
hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation operations despite the high resource
demands required to sustain such operations (Evans, 2010; Stanovich et al., 2014). When
these cognitive resources are lacking - as is often the case in unfamiliar or stressful
situations – emotional dysregulation tends to follow. It would thus be more appropriate to
suggest that a lack of sustained coordination between analytic and experiential processes
can result in emotional dysregulation, rather than experiential processing being the de
facto source of behavioral disinhibition.
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The second conceptual concern related to the results of this study is that habitual
or dispositional tendencies towards the use of maladaptive coping strategies are not a
direct indication of experiential cognitive processing. Rather, they are a consequence of
the breakdown in cognitive decoupling that often occurs in unfamiliar or high stress
situations. The results of this study support such an interpretation. The maladaptive
coping strategies of emotional cutoff, emotional reactivity, and ruminative introspection
are best understood in terms of their direct relationship to high stress environmental
conditions and challenging personal or interpersonal circumstances. High scores across
these variables thus provide a descriptive account of a client’s cognitive resource capacity
under a given set of personal circumstances rather than serving as a globalized or
otherwise general explanatory account of their cognitive processing capabilities.
Put another way, a tendency to rely on maladaptive coping strategies in daily life
does not indicate a deficit in cognitive potential. Experiential cognitions are neither
inherently problematic nor indicative of an underlying processing issue. High scores on
the experiential variables in this study therefore serve to describe behavioral tendencies
under stressful conditions rather than to explain presenting concerns as a consequence of
biases towards experiential processing. This distinction is important so as to ensure that
clients are not negatively conceptualized or described as “experiential processors.” As
previously noted, dual process theories are clinically atheoretical and should not be used
to explain why presenting concerns exist. Any such clinical explanations should be
derived from the psychological constructs of attachment, empathy, or introspection rather
than dual process theories.
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Beyond these concerns, the current study suggests that the orientation model can
provide a unique foundation for conceptualizing client concerns in the therapeutic
process. Until further studies are conducted, however, several conceptual adjustments
must be made to any interpretation of clinical results. First, the results of this study
suggest that analytic cognition, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and reflective
introspection may align under the latent measure of positive self-regard related to
adaptability or perceptiveness, whereas emotional cutoff, emotional reactivity, and
ruminative introspection correspond with emotional vulnerability or sensitivity. Second,
analytic cognition appears to be a separate indicator of latent self-awareness or
unconscious insight, and statistically unrelated to the other variables. Third, until the
measures in the orientation model have been standardized and appropriate cutoff scores
applied based upon more generalizable research studies, any use of categorical levels of
intensity (e.g., low, medium, or high scores) for interpreting client dispositional
tendencies would be utterly arbitrary.
At the same time, each individual set of measures can still be effectively used to
determine the dispositional tendencies of clients in those respective psychological
domains without reference to the overarching tenets of the orientation model. Since the
conceptual framework established by the orientation model does not require any
allegiance to a dual processing framework for interpretation, the measures can be still
used independently to conceptualize client presenting concerns. The same premise
applies to supervisors or counselor educators interested in determining the growth
trajectory of supervisees or counselor-in-training. Despite the need for continued research
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to validate the conceptual framework of the orientation model, its empirically-validated
measures provide a flexible and beneficial tool for clinical and supervisory practices.
Limitations
There were several important limitations in this study. The participants represent a
convenience sample that considerably limits the generalizability of study results beyond
college students at a medium-sized, Midwestern research university. This limitation is
further enhanced by the more particular selection of university participants, all of whom
were first-time undergraduate freshmen in a selected freshman seminar course. In terms
of self-knowledge and general developmental concerns, this population may be limited in
terms of the insight and awareness needed to accurately identify their own dispositional
tendencies. The accuracy with which they perceive their own tendencies might also be
limited by their relative lack of life experience when compared to older and more
experienced populations. Participants were also taken from a general student population
that was not assessed in terms of a personal mental health history, which might have
resulted in a greater tendency to self-score towards the mean. A similar concern stems
from the potential role of social desirability bias, as having participants complete the
assessment during a college class may have resulted in a misrepresentation of their actual
self-perceptions. Finally, results from participants enrolled at a specific Midwestern
university further limits the generalizability of the study.
A second limitation is related to the selection of instruments. In order to maximize
the likelihood of participation, short-forms for each instrument were used to reduce the
total number of items required to complete the survey. While this decision reduced the
total number of items used in the survey nearly fourfold, it may have significantly
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impacted the robustness of subsequent results. In turn, the internal reliability estimates for
each of the measures were significantly lower than those produced by the long-forms.
Whereas all of the subscales derived from the long-forms have been shown to result in
Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from good to excellent in the existing literature, the
short-forms used in this study ranged only from questionable to good. The Faith in
Intuition subscale – for which results across all analyses in this study were insignificant –
had the lowest reliability score among the sub-measures (α = .672). While an analysis of
study results seems to suggest that this lack of statistical significance was likely a result
of construct validity issues, the possibility that its long-form version might have produced
alternative results cannot be discounted.
A third limitation in this study was the absence of a baseline measure to gauge
participant mental health. The lack of an evidence-based mental health assessment to
determine the relationship between orientation model scores and general mental health
concerns inhibits the generalizability of study results to clinical populations. The study
provides no clear indication as to whether mental health status could influence the
significance of findings among the orientation model variables. However, this particular
limitation does not necessarily apply in terms of using the study findings to extrapolate
to, presumably, more normative populations such as clinical supervisees or counselors-intraining.
The results might therefore be considered generalizable to active student
populations rather than to the population at large, and thus of use in counselor training.
However, readers should remain cautious about extrapolating these findings beyond a
college freshman population in a selected area of the United States. As an initial step
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towards developing a research protocol for investigating analytic and experiential dualprocessing tendencies based on the premises of the orientation model, the current study
was designed to ascertain whether or not the hypothesized relationships among model
variables would hold up to scrutiny. In this respect, future studies should extend upon the
preliminary foundation established herein by conducting research with both different
groups of participants and different combinations of model variables.
Future Research
There are several directions in which future research could expand upon this study
and refine its limitations. First, future studies should be conducted with alternative
clinical and non-clinical populations. Since the orientation model is primarily designed as
a clinical tool for the assessment of mental health outcomes and case conceptualization
purposes, working with participants in mental health settings would be of substantial
value. While this could certainly include the use of mental health assessment tools such
as the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg, 1978), studies could also be
designed to investigate the role of dual-processing tendencies among specific clinical
populations or within the bounds of certain psychological diagnoses. It would be
particularly interesting to combine the two, such as in comparing the role of dualprocessing tendencies among inpatient and outpatient populations for generalized anxiety
disorders. A similar course of study would be beneficial related to populations with
differing age ranges, socio-economic statuses, and educational backgrounds.
Secondly, future research might adjust the instruments used to analyze dualprocessing tendencies in the orientation model. For example, studies could include the
full forms for each instrument rather than the short-forms used in the current study. While
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this would substantially increase the time required for participants to complete the
survey, the results would likely yield a more refined set of data. Internal consistency
estimates for each of the long-forms reflect a substantially higher level of reliability
which could, in turn, produce a richer data set for analysis. Either finding a new measure
to replace the Faith in Intuition subscale or developing a new measure of experiential
cognition altogether could be of value. However, the researcher would not necessarily
deem the development of a new measure necessary unless further studies conclude that
the long-form of the Faith in Intuition subscale is also statistically unrelated to the
experiential variables in the orientation model.
A third direction could stem from a new set of research hypotheses regarding the
role of low analytic cognition scores in determining experiential dual-processing
tendencies. While this would require a new approach to interpreting the orientation
model, it would align with the proposition set forth by some dual process theorists that
experiential cognitions are not directly measurable (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011).
Instead, standardizing the scores among the analytic variable set and determining cutoff
scores from research conducted across more generalizable populations could result in a
streamlined version of the orientation model that still upholds its conceptual foundation.
Furthermore, measures of varying mental health constructs that correlate with the Need
for Cognition subscale could be incorporated into the orientation model itself and thereby
expand its practical use for case conceptualization purposes. Such a process would
require a considerable overhaul of the structure and design within the orientation model
but might lead to a further enriching of the model as a result.
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A fourth direction for future studies could involve analyzing the model variables
in different combinations or with the inclusion of new or additional subscales. For
example, the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt,
2003) is actually composed of four subscales: Emotional Cutoff, Emotional Reactivity,
Fusion with Others, and I-Position. Considering the negative valence of attachment
scores as found in this study, it would be interesting to examine whether the positive
language used for the I-Position items - such as “I tend to remain calm even under stress”
- would correlate more heavily with analytic cognition scores than did emotional cutoff.
Including a second set of measures related to introspective tendencies could also be of
value, as the literature on self-consciousness discusses the value of distinguishing
between particular four types of self-focused attention: reflection, rumination, insight,
and internal state awareness (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). Finally, including the
complete four factor scales for the REI, DSI-R, and IRI would likely provide
considerably more robust results for analysis.
Conclusion
This study was designed to validate the conceptual tenets of the orientation model
as a strength-based conceptualization framework for humanistic counseling practices.
Designed using dual-process theories as its theoretical basis and humanistic-existential
tenets for its conceptual foundation, the model is intended to provide counselors with a
flexible assessment tool that addresses important client attributes within a dispositional
model of client cognitive processing patterns. Using empirically-validated measures
related to the constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection,
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the orientation model proposes that counselors can effectively supplement their clinical
observations and judgments with atheoretical measures of client dispositional tendencies.
While the current study failed to provide a complete validation of the orientation
model, the results did lend support to certain aspects of its conceptual structure. The Faith
in Intuition subscale proved to be a poor measure of experiential cognition and its
replacement with an alternative measure or newly designed measure may be necessary.
Offsetting these results, the Need for Cognition subscale was a significant predictor of
nearly all variables in the orientation model and its descriptive value led to a potential
reorganization of the orientation model for future studies. The hypothesized relationship
of each variable to optimal mental health functioning was validated, as was the
relationship between analytic cognition and the use of healthy coping strategies.
Overall, results of the current study suggest that the orientation model provides a
descriptive framework for distinguishing self-perceived adaptiveness or perceptiveness
from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity. Rather than providing an explanatory
foundation tied to dual process theories, any clinical use of the orientation model may
benefit from avoiding theoretical generalizations related to dual processing altogether.
Reliance solely upon the psychological constructs to inform clinical judgments or case
conceptualization practices may thus be warranted at this time. This interpretation was
examined in relation to the dual-processing literature, its practical implications for use in
both clinical and supervisory settings was discussed, and directions for future research
and theory generation were suggested.
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CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title: The Orientation Model Survey
Researcher: Brett Wilkinson, M.A., Counselor Education & Supervision
Research Advisor: Heather Helm, Ph.D., Counselor Education & Supervision
Researcher Email: brett.wilkinson@unco.edu Advisor Email: heather.helm@unco.edu
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled “The Orientation Model
Survey”, designed to assess individual patterns of information processing related to the
areas of cognition, relationships, empathic awareness, and introspection. This study is
being conducted by Brett Wilkinson, a doctoral student in the Counselor Education and
Supervision Department at the University of Northern Colorado, under the supervision of
Dr. Heather Helm.
This study includes four questionnaires asking you to identify how you typically think,
feel, and respond in a variety of situations. It should take approximately 5 to 10 minutes
to complete. Your replies will be confidential and you may stop participating at any time.
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study, and you must be 18
years or older to participate. While there are no immediate benefits of participation, you may
gain some insight and self-awareness as a result of considering survey items. Participants will
be entered into a drawing to win one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift cards. The winners will
be selected using a random number generator, and contacted to collect the prize via email.
Data collected and analyzed for this study will be kept on the UNC campus in a locked file
cabinet and locked office. No one other than the researcher will have access to this material.
We will assign a subject number to you. Only the primary researcher will know the name
connected with a subject number and when data is reported, your name will not be used.
Identifiable data will be destroyed three years following the end of data collection.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if you begin
participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Your decision will be
respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Having
read the above and having had an opportunity to ask any questions, please click “Start” below
if you would like to participate in this research and you are 18 years of age or older. A copy
of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference. If you have any concerns
about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please contact Sherry May, IRB
Administrator, Office of Sponsored Programs, 25 Kepner Hall, University of Northern
Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910.
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Rational Experiential Inventory (REI)
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996)
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not very true of me
very true of me

1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
3. I prefer to challenge my thinking abilities rather than do things that require little
thought.
4. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
6. I trust my initial feelings about people.
7. I believe in trusting my hunches.
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know.
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Differentiation of Self Inventory - Short Form (DSI-SF)
(Drake, Murdock, Marszalek, & Barber, 2015)
1------------------------2-------------------------3-----------------------4---------------------5
not very true of me
very true of me

1. I tend to distance myself when people get too close to me.
2. At times my feelings get the best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly.
3. I’m often uncomfortable when people get too close to me.
4. At times, I feel as if I’m riding an emotional roller coaster.
5. I’m overly sensitive to criticism.
6. If I have had an argument with my spouse or partner, I tend to think about it all day.
7. When one of my relationships becomes very intense, I feel the urge to run away.
8. If someone is upset with me, I can’t seem to let it go easily.
9. I’m very sensitive to being hurt by others.
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
(Davis, 1980)
1----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4----------------------5
doesn’t describe me well
describes me very well

1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.
3. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
4. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
6. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective.
7. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
8. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments.
9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I often don’t feel very much pity for them.
10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
13. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while.
14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place
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Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ)
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999)
1--------------------2---------------------3--------------------4----------------------5
strongly disagree
strongly agree
1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop thinking about
2. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself
3. I always seem to be rehashing in my mind things I’ve said or done
4. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with (RS)
5. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long (RS)
6. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over embarrassing or disappointing moments
7. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with
8. People often say I’m a “deep”, introspective person
9. I’m very self-inquisitive by nature
10. I'm not really a meditative type of person (RS)
11. I love analyzing why I do things
12. Contemplating myself isn’t my idea of fun (RS)
13. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things
14. I often love to look at my life in philosophical ways

156

APPENDIX F
RESEARCHER-DEVELOPED DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE

157
Researcher-Developed Demographics Questionnaire
Please specify your age:
o under 18
o 18-19
o 20-25
o 26-35
o 36-45
o 46-55
o 55 or over

Please specify your gender.
o Male
o Female

Please specify your race.
o White
o Black or African American
o Hispanic or Latino
o Asian or Pacific Islander
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Other
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Formal Announcement of Research Opportunity to First-Year Seminar Students

To All First-Year Seminar Students,
You’re invited to participate in a brief research survey on information processing styles. It
involves answering 49 questions and takes about 5-10 minutes. Your responses are
confidential and you must be 18 years or older. Participation is completely voluntary.
Participants can choose to enter a prize drawing for one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift
cards for completing the entire survey. If you are interested and over the age of 18, please
click the link below:
[SPACE TO INSERT QUALTRICS LINK]
Thank you,
Brett D Wilkinson
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Follow-up Announcement of Research Opportunity to First-Year Seminar Students

To All First-Year Seminar Students,
This is a follow-up email to remind students about the following survey opportunity:
You’re invited to participate in a brief research survey on information processing styles. It
involves answering 50 questions and takes about 5-10 minutes. Your responses are
confidential and you must be 18 years or older. Participation is completely voluntary.
Participants can choose to enter a prize drawing for one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift
cards for completing the entire survey. If you are interested and over the age of 18, please
click the link below:
[SPACE TO INSERT QUALTRICS LINK]
Thank you,
Brett D Wilkinson
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Institutional Review Board
DATE:

November 3, 2015

TO:
FROM:

Brett Wilkinson, MA
University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB

PROJECT TITLE:
SUBMISSION TYPE:

[417697-2] The Orientation Survey

ACTION:
DECISION DATE:

Amendment/Modification
APPROVAL/VERIFICATION OF EXEMPT STATUS
November 2, 2015

Thank you for your submission of Amendment/Modification materials for this project. The
University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB approves this project and verifies its status as
EXEMPT according to federal IRB regulations.
Thanks for a clear resubmit. I wanted to note for IRBs record you said 100$ at one
place in the narrative, but I know you meant 50 and should correct.
Best Wishes,
Maria
We will retain a copy of this correspondence within our records for a duration of 4 years.
If you have any questions, please contact Sherry May at 970-351-1910 or
Sherry.May@unco.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all
correspondence with this committee.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within
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